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I. INTRODUCTION
Anyone who has walked into a courthouse knows that litigation carries a heavy
price tag. Lawsuits take a lot of time and cost a lot of money. Rights that abound in
litigation not only protect parties but also burden them. The American judicial
system is replete with discovery, motion practice, and appeals that can prolong cases
for years and result in astronomical attorneys’ fees.1 Arbitration is a way out of the
courthouse. It is a voluntary method of alternative dispute resolution that enables the
parties to a conflict to avoid the wasteful complexities of the judicial system.2 There
is a price tag here too: sacrificing procedural and substantive rights.
Passed in 1925, the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”)3 repudiated a history of
judicial hostility toward arbitration and made arbitration agreements enforceable.4
This pro-arbitration statute sought to afford merchants and businesspersons such as
the buyers and sellers of textiles, produce, and raw materials an efficient alternative
to litigation.5 No one could have imagined that arbitration would evolve into a
forum where the submission of securities law claims and civil rights claims would
become commonplace. The trend of arbitrating federal statutory claims caused a
battle of conflicting policies. The policies advanced in securities law, civil rights
law, and other federal statutes argued for significant court involvement in the arbitral
process. One of the fundamental policies of the FAA—promoting efficiency in
arbitration—argued for limited court participation.
Virtually everyone agreed that the courts had to have some role in reviewing
awards for procedural improprieties. No one could seriously quarrel with
empowering courts to vacate awards issued by corrupt arbitrators or arbitrators who

1
See Kenneth R. Davis, A Model for Arbitration: Autonomy, Cooperation and
Curtailment of State Power, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 167, 167-68 (1999) [hereinafter “A Model
for Arbitration”] (pointing out abusive litigation tactics that raise fees and consume time);
Jethro K. Lieberman & James F. Henry, Lessons from the Alternative Dispute Resolution
Movement, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 424, 427 (1986) (remarking that discovery can delay cases for
years); Arthur R. Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1, 9
(1984) (lambasting attorneys for abusing discovery to delay lawsuits).
2

Edward Brunet & Jennifer J. Johnson, Substantive Fairness in Securities Arbitration, 76
U. CIN. L. REV. 459, 462 (2008) (describing arbitration as an informal and private adjudicatory
process “involving reasoned presentations of proof to one or more expert arbitrators.”).
3

9 U.S.C. § 1-16 (2006).

4

See Part IV.A infra (discussing the ouster-of-jurisdiction doctrine).

5

See Part IV.C infra (discussing the role of arbitration at the time the FAA was enacted).
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denied parties fair hearings.6 Disagreement focused on the scope of judicial review
for errors of law committed by arbitrators. Some commentators have argued that
because arbitration is a substitute for litigation, the courts should exercise at least
some review of substantive errors of law.7 Others have countered that the policy of
efficiency, which animates arbitration, forecloses judges from meddling with
arbitration awards.8
Decided in 1953, Wilko v. Swan9 was the first case to address this conflict. In
Wilko, the United States Supreme Court refused to allow the arbitration of federal
securities fraud claims brought under § 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933.10
Defending its holding that public policy forbade arbitrators to decide such claims,
the Court observed in dicta that the narrow scope of judicial review of arbitration
awards was too meager to ensure that the rights provided in § 12(2) would protect
victims of securities fraud.11 The Wilko opinion suggested that a court could not
vacate an award for errors “in the interpretations of the law by arbitrators” unless the
errors showed “manifest disregard” of the law.12 Although the Court’s nebulous
comment offered scant guidance on what it meant by “manifest disregard,” this
puzzling phrase so impressed the federal courts that one by one they adopted
manifest disregard of the law as a narrow standard of review for errors of law in
arbitration awards.13 The most common view of the doctrine was that an arbitrator
6

See Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. § 10(3) (2006). Section 10 of the FAA
provides that a district court, upon motion, may vacate an award:

(1)

where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;

(2)

where there was evident partiality or corruption in arbitrators, or
either of them;

(3)

where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to
postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear
evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior
by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or

(4)

where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly
executed them so that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject
matter submitted was not made.
9 U.S.C. § 10 (2006).
7

See Part IV.C, D & E infra (arguing that plenary review for errors of law should apply
to cases where awards decide claims asserting federal statutory rights).
8

Id.

9

Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled on other grounds by Rodriguez de
Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989).
10

Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438.

11

Id.

12

Id. at 436-37.

13

See Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW, L.L.C., 300 F. App’x 415, 421 (2008) (listing circuit
court cases that adopted the manifest disregard standard); Michael A. Scodro, Deterrence and
Implied Limits on Arbitral Power, 55 DUKE L.J. 547, 567 (2005) (reporting that all the federal
circuits adopted the manifest disregard standard).
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manifestly disregarded the law when the arbitrator knew controlling law and
intentionally flouted it.14
Applied to all awards, this blanket standard of review is inappropriate for
protecting federal statutory rights such as those afforded in securities law and civil
rights law. The standard has also proven unworkable. Arbitrators ordinarily do not
provide written explanations for their awards, so courts are left to speculate on
whether arbitrators intentionally flouted the law or merely misunderstood it.15 Even
if an arbitrator writes a decision, he or she will conceal having intentionally
disregarded the law, for such an admission would bring judicial rebuke and the
outcome that all arbitrators dread—vacatur of the award.
Over succeeding decades arbitration became more and more prevalent. Wilko’s
legacy of prohibiting the arbitration of federal statutory claims became an
anachronism. Supporting this change, the Supreme Court held in Shearson v.
McMahon16 that securities fraud claims brought under § 10(b) could be arbitrated.17
To justify its holding, the Court needed to refute the very point it had relied on in
Wilko—that the scope of review of arbitration awards does not safeguard the rights
of victims of securities fraud. Seeming to repudiate the manifest disregard standard,
the McMahon Court declared that the scope of review is sufficient to ensure that the
requirements of the Act are enforced.18 Nevertheless, the federal judiciary, with few
exceptions, continued to apply the manifest disregard standard as if the high Court
had never decided McMahon.
Years later, in Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.,19 the Supreme Court
held that the FAA provides the exclusive grounds for judicial review of arbitration
awards.20 Therefore, an arbitration agreement could not expand the grounds for
14

See, e.g., B.L. Harbert Int’l, LLC v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905, 910 (11th Cir.
2006) (stating that the manifest disregard standard permits vacatur where there is “clear
evidence that the arbitrator was ‘conscious of the law and deliberately ignore[d] it.’”);
Flexible Mfg. Sys. Pty. Ltd. v. Super Prods. Corp., 86 F.3d 96, 100 (7th Cir. 1996) (requiring
a deliberate error of law to justify vacatur); Mich. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Unigard Sec. Ins. Co., 44
F.3d 826, 832 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that a court may vacate an award under the manifest
disregard standard where the arbitrator “recognized the applicable law and then ignored it.”);
Merrill Lynch, Pierce Fenner & Smith v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir. 1986)
(interpreting manifest disregard to mean that the arbitrator knew the law and intentionally
ignored it); Stephen L. Hayford, Law in Disarray: Judicial Standards for Vacatur of
Commercial Arbitration Awards, 30 GA. L. REV. 731, 816-17 (1996) (describing the manifest
disregard standard as requiring an intentional error of the arbitrator).
15

See Scodro, supra note 13, at 604 (noting that “a written award [is] a rarity in
commercial arbitration”); Paul F. Kirgis, Judicial Review and the Limits of Arbitral Authority:
Lessons from the Law of Contract, 81 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 99, 119-20 (2007) (proposing that
arbitrators be required to write opinions explaining their awards, which would be a change
from the customary practice); Frances T. Freeman Jalet, The Judicial Attitude, 45 CORNELL
L.Q. 519, 522 (1960) (stating that ordinarily arbitrators do not provide written opinions to
explain the reasoning they employed in deciding the issues presented to them).
16

Shearson v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).

17

Id. at 242.

18

Id. at 232.

19

Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 577 (2008).

20

Id. at 578.
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judicial review prescribed in the FAA. This decision brought into question whether
the Hall Street Court, by implication, abolished the manifest disregard standard. The
Court, however, did not decide this issue, but rather confused the bar with alternative
interpretations of the ambiguous dicta in Wilko, scrambling words like eggs in a
skillet.21 This confusion has led to conflicting judicial decisions, some courts
holding that the manifest disregard standard survived Hall Street, others holding that
Hall Street signaled the death of the manifest disregard standard.22
In Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp.,23 the Court lapsed into selfcontradiction. Although the court declined to decide whether the manifest disregard
standard survived Hall Street, it professed to apply the standard arguendo.24 The
Court, however, did not apply the manifest disregard standard, but rather applied the
broadest standard of plenary review. While engaging in this more searching review,
the Stolt-Nielsen Court compounded the confusion by citing Hall Street for the
proposition that the FAA permits only limited review for errors of law.25 Most
recently, in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,26 the Court suggested that the FAA
does not permit any review for errors of law in arbitration awards, though once again
unclear dicta assured continued uncertainty.
Indecision and self-contradiction have served as the dubious guideposts in this
befuddling area of law. Nevertheless, some points are clear. First, Concepcion
suggests that the Supreme Court views the manifest disregard standard with disfavor.
Second, this disfavor foreshadows the end of substantive review of arbitration
awards. Third, by moving in this direction, the Supreme Court has strayed from
sound policy by rejecting the McMahon dicta.
Guided by the purposes of the FAA, its legislative history, and the role of
commercial arbitration in modern society, this Article proposes a new framework for
the judicial review of arbitration awards. Awards deciding federal statutory rights
such as those conferred by securities law and civil rights law should be reviewed for
errors of law. As recognized in Wilko and McMahon, federal rights deserve
protection, even in arbitration. There is one other type of award that requires judicial
correction. Despite the statements in Hall Street and Concepcion that the FAA
provides the exclusive grounds for vacatur, the courts must correct awards that
violate well-defined federal public policy, particularly those that endanger public
health, safety, or welfare, or condone unlawful acts. All other awards should not be
reviewed, on the federal level, for errors of law. Where an award does not decide a
federal right or violate federal public policy, the FAA policy favoring efficiency in
arbitration trumps any need of judicial review for errors of law.
Part II of this Article discusses Wilko and First Options of Chicago, Inc. v.
Kaplan,27 the Supreme Court decisions, which, perhaps unwittingly, led to the
21

Id. at 585.

22

See infra Part III.B (cataloguing and analyzing cases interpreting Hall Street).

23

Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1761 (2010).

24

Id. at 1768 n.3.

25

Id. at 1776.

26

AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).

27

First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kapan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2012

5

92

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:87

establishment and confirmation of the manifest disregard standard. This Part also
examines the reaction of the lower federal courts to this dubious standard of review.
Part III analyzes Hall Street, a perplexing decision which provided alternative
interpretations of what “manifest disregard” might mean. The unfortunate result of
Hall Street is that some courts have declared the manifest disregard standard dead
while others have held that it is still viable.
Part IV explores the McMahon and Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,28
decisions in which the Supreme Court contradicted its dicta in Wilko and stated that
errors of law in cases involving federal statutory rights were reviewable. Part IV
shows that such review finds support in both the legislative history of the FAA and
the evolution of arbitration since passage of the Act.
Part V begins with a discussion of Stolt-Nielsen, observing that the Supreme
Court, though asserting that it was applying the manifest disregard standard
arguendo, applied de novo review to nullify a partial award that would have violated
FAA policy. Stolt-Nielsen therefore suggested that the Court might be receptive to
an expanded scope of review under the proper circumstances. In Concepcion,
however, the Court seemed to reject this possibility. Despite Concepcion, Part V
advocates that awards violating well-defined federal public policy be subject to
judicial correction at the federal level. This Part goes on to propose that there should
be no federal judicial review for awards not determining federal statutory rights or
violating well-defined federal public policy.
Finally, this Part addresses the
potential objection that the framework proposed in this Article would reduce the
efficiency of arbitration.
The Article concludes with Part VI, which emphasizes the need to balance the
policies of the FAA to promote the efficiency of arbitration with the policies of other
federal laws. The approach proposed in this Article achieves a suitable balance. The
Supreme Court has floundered on this issue for nearly sixty years. The
jurisprudence of arbitration cannot withstand another sixty. It is time for Congress
to set things right.
II. MANIFEST DISREGARD: EMERGENCE AND CONFIRMATION
The Supreme Court, on numerous occasions, has addressed the standard that a
court should apply when reviewing errors of law made in arbitration awards. The
first such case was Wilko v. Swan.29 It is regrettable that the Wilko decision resorted
to ambiguous dicta, which has spawned confusion persisting to this very day.
A. Wilko v. Swan: The Confusion Begins
Ironically, Wilko did not directly concern the scope of judicial review of
arbitration awards. Rather, the issue presented in Wilko was whether anti-fraud
claims brought under § 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 could be arbitrated, or
whether public policy required that such claims be litigated in state or federal
court.30 The facts of Wilko were straightforward. A customer claimed that a brokerdealer induced him to purchase stock by making material misrepresentations and

28

Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32 n.4 (1991)

29

Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).

30

Id. at 430.
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omitting material information.31 When the customer commenced a federal lawsuit,
under § 12(2), the broker-dealer moved to stay the action on the grounds that the
parties had entered into an arbitration agreement.32
In Wilko, the policies of the Securities Act—to protect investors from securities
fraud—clashed with the policy of the FAA—to create an environment hospitable to
arbitration agreements.33 The Supreme Court held that arbitration, though favored in
other circumstances, was not a suitable means to resolve a § 12(2) fraud claim.34
Bolstering its decision, the Court noted that arbitrators, who may not be
knowledgeable on the intricacies of securities law, do not ordinarily write decisions
or keep transcripts of hearings.35 These practices prevented courts from effectively
reviewing arbitration awards.36 To protect investors from securities fraud, stronger
procedural safeguards were required than those embedded in arbitration’s informal
approach to dispute resolution.37
The Supreme Court, therefore, reversed the order of the Second Circuit, which
held the arbitration agreement enforceable.38 The Second Circuit, as part of its
rationale for holding § 12(2) claims arbitratable, observed that “arbitrators are bound
to decide in accordance with the provisions of section 12(2).”39 If arbitrators
committed errors in interpreting the securities laws, such errors would “constitute
31

Id. at 428-29.

32
Id. at 429. The broker-dealer moved under § 3 of the FAA, which provides: “If any suit
or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon any issue referable to
arbitration, the court . . . shall upon application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action
until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement . . . .” 9
U.S.C. § 3 (2006).
33

Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953).

34

Id. In addition to questioning the adequacy of arbitration to resolve § 12(2) disputes,
the Court relied on the interrelationship of two sections of the Securities Act. Section 14
provides that “[a]ny condition, stipulation, or provision . . . of this subchapter or of the rules
and regulations of the Commission shall be void.” Section 22(a) provides that “[t]he district
courts of the United States . . . shall have jurisdiction . . . concurrent with State and Territorial
courts . . . of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty
created by this subchapter.” The Court concluded that an arbitration agreement constitutes an
impermissible § 14 waiver of the § 22(a) right to sue in a state or federal district court. Id. at
434-35. The Second Circuit had rejected this reasoning, noting that if a party may settle a §
12(2) claim without violating the § 14 no-waiver provision, the party should be allowed to
arbitrate such a claim. U.S. v. Marachowsky, 201 F.2d 5, 11 (7th Cir. 1953). Years later, the
Supreme Court, in Rodriquez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477
(1989), overruled Wilko and reversed its position on the waiver argument, observing that “[b]y
agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forego the substantive rights of the
statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.”
Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at 481 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
35

Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).

36

Id.

37

Id. at 437.

38

Id. at 438.

39

Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 440, 445 (2d Cir. 1953).
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grounds for vacating the award pursuant to section 10 of the Federal Arbitration
Act.”40 The Supreme Court, in reversing the Second Circuit, could not leave this
point unanswered. If, as the Second Circuit stated, section 12(2) arbitration awards
were subject to plenary judicial review for errors of law, the Supreme Court’s
holding – that arbitration inadequately protects the statutory rights of victimized
investors – would be undermined. The Supreme Court’s refutation of the Second
Circuit’s observation on the scope of judicial review began as follows:
While it may be true, as the Court of Appeals thought, that a failure of the
arbitrators to decide in accordance with the provisions of the Securities
Act would “constitute grounds for vacating the award pursuant to section
10 of the Federal Arbitration Act,” that failure would need to be made
clearly to appear.41
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court then lapsed into muddled dicta, which has cast the
issue of the scope of judicial review of arbitration awards into uncertainty for over
half a century. The Court stated: “In unrestricted submissions, such as the present
margin agreements envisage, the interpretations of the law by the arbitrators in
contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, in the federal courts, to judicial review
for error in interpretation.”42
This statement perplexed the federal courts. As noted by the Fifth Circuit, “it is
not surprising that the lower courts initially grappled with the uncertain implications
of this clause.”43 In San Martine Compania De Navegacion v. Saguenay Terminals
LTD,44 the Ninth Circuit expressed its dismay more forcefully:
Frankly, the Supreme Court’s use of the words “manifest disregard” has
caused us trouble here. Conceivably the words may have been used to
indicate that whether an award may be set aside for errors of law would
be a question of degree. Thus if the award was based upon a mistaken
view of the law, but in their assumption of what the law was, the
arbitrators had not gone too far afield, then, the award would stand; but if
the error is an egregious one, such as no sensible layman would be guilty
of, then the award could be set aside. Such a “degree of error” test would,
we think, be most difficult to apply. Results would likely vary from judge
to judge. We believe this is not what the court had in mind when it spoke
of “manifest disregard.”45
Despite the vagueness of the Wilko dicta, the circuit courts, one by one, recognized
the manifest disregard standard.46 For example, the Second Circuit, in T.Co Metals
40

Id.

41

Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953) (citation omitted).

42

Id.

43

Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 354 (5th Cir. 2009).

44

San Marine Compania De Navegacion v. Saguenay Terminals Ltd., 293 F.2d 796 (9th
Cir. 1961).
45

Id. at 801 n.4.

46

See, e.g., Halim v. Great Gatsby’s Auction Gallery, Inc., 516 F.3d 557, 563 (7th Cir.
2008) (stating that “factual or legal error, no matter how gross, is insufficient to support
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LLC v. Dempsey Pipe and Supply, Inc.,47 noted that the manifest disregard of the law
standard is not met when the arbitrator makes a simple legal error.48 The doctrine
applies only when three elements are met.49 First, the law applicable to the issue
under decision must be clear.50 Second, the arbitrator must have improperly applied
the law and the error must have affected the outcome of the case.51 Third, the
arbitrator must have known the applicable law and intentionally ignored it.52
Focusing on the third element of the Second Circuit’s definition, the Tenth Circuit
defined “manifest disregard” more succinctly. The doctrine applies when the
arbitrators “knew the law and explicitly disregarded it.”53 This is the predominant
definition of the manifest disregard standard.54
overturning an arbitration award.”); Collins v. D.R. Horton., Inc., 505 F.3d 874, 879 (9th Cir.
2007) (quoting San Martine De Navegacion for the proposition that a court may vacate an
award under the manifest disregard standard only when the arbitrator knew the law and
intentionally ignored it); Three S Delaware Inc. v. DataQuick Info. Sys., Inc., 492 F.3d 520,
527 (4th Cir. 2007) (confirming that the Fourth Circuit recognizes the manifest disregard
standard as arising from “common law”); McCarthy v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 463 F.3d
87, 93 (1st Cir. 2006) (asserting that the manifest disregard standard requires that the
arbitrator “willfully” decided not to apply governing law); Dominion Video Satellite, Inc. v.
Echostar Satellite L.L.C., 430 F.3d 1269, 1275 (10th Cir. 2005) (defining “manifest disregard”
to mean more than an error of law but rather an error resulting from an arbitrator’s “explicit”
refusal to apply controlling law); Manion v. Nagin, 392 F.3d 294, 298 (8th Cir. 2004) (stating
that to manifestly disregard the law the arbitrator must “clearly identify” governing law and
ignore it); Hoeft v. MVL Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 57, 65 (2d Cir. 2003) (characterizing the
manifest disregard standard as a product of “common law”); Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d
365, 370 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that the result of judicial application of the “exceedingly
narrow” manifest disregard standard “is generally to affirm easily the arbitration award”);
Prestige Ford v. Ford Dealer Computer Servs., Inc., 324 F.3d 391, 395-96 (5th Cir. 2003)
(describing “manifest disregard” as “willfull inattentiveness to governing law”); Scott v.
Prudential Sec., Inc., 141 F.3d 1007, 1017 (11th Cir. 1998) (characterizing the manifest
disregard standard as a nonstatutory ground of review); Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105
F.3d 1465, 1487 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (recognizing that the manifest disregard standard must adapt
to varying circumstances, the scope of the standard increasing from limited review to plenary
review for errors of law when the arbitrators decide claims alleging the denial of rights
conferred by federal statutes); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Jaros, 70 F.3d
418, 421 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that an arbitrator manifestly disregards the law where an
award lacks “any line of argument that is legally plausible”).
47

T.Co Metals LLC v. Dempsey Pipe and Supply, Inc., 592 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. 2010).

48

Id. at 339.

49

Id.

50

Id.

51

Id.

52

Id.

53

Hicks v. Cadle Co., 355 F. App’x. 186, 197 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting Hollern v.
Wachovia Secs., Inc., 458 F.3d 1169, 1176 (10th Cir. 2006)). See also Frazier v. CitiFinancial
Corp., 604 F.3d 1313, 1322 (11th Cir. 2010) (noting that manifest disregard of the law means
that the arbitrator deliberately ignored controlling law).
54

See supra note 46 and accompanying text (setting forth the prevalent definition of the
manifest disregard standard).
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Because of the vagueness of the phrase “manifest disregard of the law,” not all
circuits have defined the term identically. In Merrill Lynch, Pierce Fenner & Smith
v. Jaros,55 for example, the Sixth Circuit stated, “If a court can find any line of
argument that is legally plausible and supports the award then it must be confirmed.
Only where no judge or groups of judges could conceivably come to the same
determination as the arbitrators must the award be set aside.”56 Unlike the Second
Circuit’s standard, which requires deliberate disregard of controlling law, the Sixth
Circuit in Jaros seems to adopt a less deferential “clearly erroneous” standard.
In Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. v. Bacon,57 the Fifth Circuit expressed a third
variation of what “manifest disregard” might mean. The Fifth Circuit held that for a
legal error to rise to the level of manifest disregard of the law it “must have been
obvious and capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the average person
qualified to serve as an arbitrator.”58 This standard is even more confounding than
the ones adopted by the Second and Sixth Circuits. There is no GRE for arbitrators.
Some are lawyers who understand the legal principles governing the matter
presented for arbitration. Others are chosen as arbitrators because they have
experience with and expertise in the trade practices relevant to the case. Still others
are not conversant or even familiar with the applicable law or with relevant trade
practices. One can only guess at how a judge might determine the acumen of the
“average” person qualified to serve as an arbitrator. One can only puzzle at why a
standard of judicial review should depend on what such a hypothetical person can
“instantly perceive.”
B. First Option v. Kaplan: Dubious Confirmation
It was not until 1995, in First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan,59 that the
Supreme Court again mentioned the manifest disregard standard. Manuel and Carol
Kaplan and their wholly-owned investment company, MKI Investments, incurred
losses in the stock market crash of 1987 and later in 1989.60 Their clearing firm,
First Options of Chicago (“First Options”), liquidated certain MKI assets and
demanded that the Kaplans pay the deficiency.61 When the Kaplans refused, First
Options initiated an arbitration proceeding under the auspices of the Philadelphia
Stock Exchange.62 MKI accepted the propriety of arbitration, but the Kaplans, who
had not personally signed an arbitration agreement, denied the authority of the
arbitration panel to hear their case.63 The panel decided that it had such authority

55

Merrill Lynch, Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Jaros, 70 F.3d 418 (6th Cir. 1995).

56

Id. at 421.

57

Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349 (5th Cir. 2009).

58

Id. at 354.

59

First Options of Chicago, Inc v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995).

60

Id. at 940.

61

Id.

62

Id.

63

Id. at 941.
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and ultimately ruled in favor of First Options on the merits of the dispute.64 The
district court confirmed the award, but the Third Circuit vacated it, holding that the
dispute was not arbitrable.65
The issue presented to the Supreme Court was whether the courts or the
arbitrators had the authority to determine the arbitrability of the dispute between
First Options and the Kaplans.66 In explaining the practical importance of the issue,
the Court commented on the narrow scope of judicial review of arbitration awards.
If the arbitrators had the authority to decide arbitrability, their decision would be
nearly immune to judicial oversight. 67 To prove its point, the Court cited Wilko,
noting parenthetically and without elaboration that “parties [are] bound by
arbitrator’s decision not in ‘manifest disregard’ of the law.”68 This casual reference
to Wilko did nothing to clarify the meaning of “manifest disregard” of the law. It
did, however, confirm that the Supreme Court viewed manifest disregard of the law
as a viable standard.
III. HALL STREET V. MATTEL: CONFUSION CONFIRMED
In Hall Street Assocs. L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.,69 the Supreme Court discussed the
ambiguities in Wilko’s comments on the scope of judicial review of arbitration
awards. As if baffled by a parchment of ancient hieroglyphics, the Court could not
decipher what the curious dicta in Wilko meant.
A. The Hall Street Case
Hall Street involved a landlord-tenant dispute. Hall Street leased a property to
Mattel, which agreed, in a written lease, to indemnify Hall Street for costs arising
from violations of environmental laws committed by Mattel or its predecessortenants.70 After the discovery of pollutants discharged at the site by Mattel’s
predecessors, Mattel signed a consent order to clean up the site, and it terminated the
lease.71 Hall Street asserted its right to indemnification, a claim which Mattel
64

Id.

65

Id.

66

Emphasizing that arbitration is “simply a matter of contract,” Justice Breyer, writing for
a unanimous Court, stated that the agreement itself will determine the resolution of the
arbitrability issue. Id. at 943. Justice Breyer cautioned, however, that arbitrators may
determine the issue of arbitrability only if the evidence of such an agreement is clear and
unmistakable. Id. at 944. Because First Options could not meet this standard, Justice Breyer
concluded that the issue of arbitrability in this case was for the court, rather than the
arbitrators, to decide. Id. at 947.
67

Id. at 942.

68
Id. The court also noted that, under § 10 of the FAA, a court may vacate an award
procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means or if the arbitrator exceeded his powers. Id.
69

Hall Street Assocs. L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008).

70

Id. at 579.

71

Id. Tests of the property’s well water, conducted in 1998, indicated high levels of
trichloroethylene. After the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality found additional
contamination, Mattel stopped using the well, and, along with one of its predecessors, signed
the consent decree in which it undertook to clean up the site. Id.
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contested.72 The parties entered into an agreement to submit this dispute to
arbitration.73 The arbitration agreement provided: “The [District] Court shall vacate,
modify or correct any award: (i) where the arbitrator’s findings of fact are not
supported by substantial evidence, or (ii) where the arbitrator’s conclusions of law
are erroneous.”74
The arbitrator decided for Mattel, ruling the indemnification provision
inapplicable to the violation committed by Mattel’s predecessors.75 The district
court granted Hall Street’s motion to vacate the award, 76 invoking the parties’
agreement ostensibly authorizing the court to vacate an award based on an erroneous
conclusion of law.77 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling,
on the ground that the arbitration agreement’s judicial review provision was
unenforceable.78 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case, instructing the
district court to confirm the original arbitration award.79

72

Id. Hall Street filed a summons and complaint in federal district court, disputing
Mattel’s right to terminate the lease and seeking to enforce the indemnification clause. Mattel
prevailed on the termination issue. The parties then attempted to mediate the indemnification
claim, but after their efforts at mediation proved unsuccessful, they agreed to submit the
dispute to arbitration. The court approved the arbitration agreement and entered an order
accordingly. Id.
73

Id.

74

Id.

75

Id. at 580. The arbitrator noted that the lease provision required Mattel to indemnify
Hall Street for violations of federal, state, and local environmental law. The pollutants found
on the leased premises violated the Oregon Drinking Water Quality Act. Characterizing this
Act as a health law, rather than an environmental law, the arbitrator found the indemnification
provision inapplicable. Id.
76

Id.

77

Id. The district court held that the Oregon Drinking Water Quality Act was an
environmental law and remanded the matter to the arbitrator. On remand, the arbitrator
decided for Hall Street. Both parties moved in the district court to modify the arbitrator’s
decision. The district court, again applying a plenary standard of review as stipulated by the
parties, corrected the arbitrator’s calculation of interest and otherwise confirmed. Id.
78
Id. at 581. The district court granted Hall Street’s motion to vacate upholding the
parties contract to expand the scope of judicial review to include errors of law, relying on
LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 889 (9th Cir. 1997) . The Ninth Circuit
reversed the judgment of the district court in favor of Mattel holding that according to
Kyocera, the Ninth Circuit’s recent en banc decision, “the terms of the arbitration agreement
controlling the mode of judicial review are unenforceable and severable.” Hall Street Assocs.,
L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 113 Fed. Appx. 272, 272-73 (2004) (quoting Kyocera Corp. v.
Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 1000 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc); see also
Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 936 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that parties may
not contractually expand the scope of judicial review of arbitration awards); cf. Syncor Int’l
Corp. v. McLeland, 120 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 1997), 1997 WL 45245 *6 (reaching the same
conclusion in an unpublished opinion). But see Puerto Rico Tel. Co. v. U.S. Phone Mfg.
Corp., 427 F.3d 21, 31 (1st Cir. 2005) (upholding contractual expansion of arbitrator’s scope
of review); Jacada (Europe), Ltd. v. Int’l Mktg. Strategies, Inc., 401 F.3d 701, 710 (6th Cir.
2005); Roadway Package Sys., Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287, 288 (3d Cir. 2001); Gateway
Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 997 (5th Cir. 1995); cf. UHC Mgt. Co. v.
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1. The Supreme Court Decision: Obfuscation
The Supreme Court granted certiorari.80 The issue before the Court in Hall
Street was whether the parties to an arbitration agreement could validly agree to
expand the grounds prescribed in § 10 and § 11 of the FAA for vacating or
correcting an arbitration award.81 Hall Street argued that the agreement to expand
judicial review was valid, relying on the proposition that the FAA is “motivated, first
and foremost, by a congressional desire to enforce agreements into which parties
ha[ve] entered.”82 According to Hall Street, the policy favoring the enforcement of
arbitration agreements implied that courts should enforce arbitration agreements to
expand judicial review.83 The Court rejected this argument.84 While conceding that
the FAA grants the parties wide latitude in the selection of arbitrators, choice of law,
and other features of the process, the Court read the text of the statute to limit the
scope of review.85 The Court relied on two textual arguments. First, it noted that all
the grounds for vacatur prescribed in the FAA such as “corruption,” “fraud,” and
“evident partiality,” address “egregious” arbitral improprieties different in kind from
mere errors of law.86 Second, the Court cited § 9 of the FAA, which provides that a
court “must” confirm an award “unless the award is vacated, modified, or corrected
as prescribed in sections 10 and 11 of this title.”87 The mandatory wording of § 9
left no room for disagreement: the statutory grounds enumerated in § 10 and § 11 of
the FAA are exclusive.88
Computer Sciences Corp., 148 F.3d 992, 997-98 (8th Cir. 1998) (expressing in dicta that
parties may contractually expand the scope of review).
79

Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 581 (2008). The district court
again held in favor of Hall Street and the Ninth Circuit again reversed on appeal. Id.
80

Id.

81

Id. at 578.

82

Id. at 585 (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220 (1985)).

83

Id.

84

Id. at 586. See Eric S. Chafetz, An Opportunity Lost: The Supreme Court’s Failure to
Recognize the Implications of Its Holding in Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., at
14 (March 2009), available at http://bepress.com/eric_chafetz/2 (stating that, although Hall
Street may have been correctly decided on the grounds of statutory interpretation, the
Supreme Court underplayed the role of party intent).
85

Hall Street, 552 U.S. at 586.

86

Id.

87

Id. at 587.

88

Id. at 586. The Hall Street Court did not expressly rule whether parties to an arbitration
agreement could expand review by limiting the decisional powers of the arbitrators rather than
on expanding the review powers of the courts. Thus, the parties might seek to expand the
scope of review by agreeing that the arbitrators must correctly apply a particular law or the
law of a particular state and that the arbitrators exceed their powers by failing to apply such
law correctly. This strategic rewording of an arbitration clause would arguably reposition
legal errors of arbitrators within the range of § 10(a)(4) of the FAA, which provides review
when the arbitrators exceeded their powers. However, the chance that the Supreme Court, or
other courts following Hall Street, would uphold clauses using this backdoor strategy seems
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remote. Preliminarily, it should be noted that in Hall Street, the parties arbitrated the
application of an indemnification clause to the costs of cleaning up toxic waste. Neither party
asked the arbitrators to decide its rights under federal statutes such as the federal securities
laws or the federal civil rights laws. If the Court were presented with such a federal rights
issue, the analysis might proceed differently because of the exigencies of public policies
expressed in federal law. In the context of Hall Street, however, the Court emphasized that
the FAA does not allow “general review for an arbitrator’s legal errors.” Id. at 585. It would
seem that any contractual attempt to override this limitation would conflict with the Supreme
Court’s view of FAA policy. Although the Hall Street Court did not decide the enforceability
of such clauses, one could argue persuasively that directing the courts to correct all legal
errors, as Hall Street Associates and Mattel attempted to do, is functionally and therefore
legally equivalent to providing contractually that any legal error by the arbitrators exceeds
their authority and incidentally triggers judicial review. Such a deft turn of phrase is likely to
invoke charges of putting form over substance and it is unlikely to win the blessing of the
Supreme Court. Furthermore, Hall Street mentioned circumstances, including state statutory
and common law and the authority of federal courts to manage pending cases, where an award
might be subject to review broader than that permitted under the FAA. See id. at 576, 590-92.
It is telling that the Supreme Court did not list among these circumstances any contractual
maneuvers that might achieve the same result. Several scholars have considered the issue as
to whether wording arbitration clauses to place legal errors beyond the powers of the
arbitrators would circumvent Hall Street. Professor Stipanowich doubts whether the Supreme
Court would uphold such clauses. He states:
Although Hall Street came down strongly against extra-statutory bases for vacatur,
might what the Second Circuit terms “judicial gloss” permit parties to give form and
content to the boundaries of arbitrators’ authority and what constitutes “exceeding
their powers” under § 10(a)(4)? Might, for example parties trigger judicial review
of errors of law by describing a failure to faithfully observe and apply particular law
as “in excess of the arbitrator’s powers.” While it is highly doubtful that the StoltNielsen majority actively contemplated, or relishes, the prospect, there is no doubt
that hopeful attorneys will seize on the wisp of a possibility of wedging a foot in the
door of vacatur.
Thomas Stipanowich, Revelations and Reaction: The Struggle to Shape American Arbitration,
Pepperdine University School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Studies Series, Paper No.
2011/11, at 15 (Apr. 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1757258. Professor
Drahozal believes that such a clause is not an evasion of Hall Street, but it is rather an
effective use of § 10(a)(4). He therefore concludes that such clauses should be enforceable,
though he acknowledges that the weight of post-Hall Street judicial authority contradicts him.
Christopher R. Drahozal, The Supreme Court and Arbitration: Contracting Around Hall
Street, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 905, 916 (2010). See Francis v. Landstar Sys. Holdings,
Inc., No. 3:09-cv-238-J-32JRK, 2009 WL 4350250, *6, 7 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 25, 2009) (rejecting
the argument that, where an arbitration agreement limited the arbitrator’s authority to applying
controlling law correctly, an arbitrator who committed an error of law exceeded her authority
and her award was therefore subject to vacatur); Wood v. PennTex Resources, LP, No. H-062198, 2008 WL 2609319, *8 (June 27, 2008) (interpreting Hall Street to invalidate provision
in arbitration agreement stating that any clearly erroneous factual determination by the
arbitrators exceeds their powers and is therefore not subject to confirmation) . But see Cable
Connection, Inc. v. DirectTV, Inc., 190 P.3d 586, 596 (Cal. 2008) (upholding, under the
California Arbitration Act, the enforceability of an arbitration provision stating that arbitrators
exceed their power by committing legal error and that the courts are empowered to review
such errors). See generally Robert Ellis, Imperfect Minimalism: Unanswered Questions in
Hall Street Associates L.L.V. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396 (2008), 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 1187, 1195-96 (2009) (noting that after Hall Street sophisticated parties began to draft
clauses that deny arbitrators the power to make errors of law and direct courts to vacate
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Contesting this proposition, Hall Street relied on the Wilko decision. Hall Street
contended that, by establishing the manifest disregard standard, Wilko had
recognized the acceptability of expanded judicial review of arbitration awards.89
The Court rejected this argument for several reasons. Refusing to confirm that Wilko
established the manifest disregard standard, the Court stressed that, even if Wilko
had done so, “manifest disregard” was judicially rather than contractually created.90
The judicial power to expand the grounds of review did not imply an analogous
contractual right.91 Second, the Supreme Court observed that Hall Street was
seeking to enforce a provision authorizing plenary judicial review for errors of law,
whereas Wilko recognized, at the very most, a standard of review only for egregious
errors.92
The Supreme Court also took note of the “vagueness of Wilko’s phrasing,”
speculating about the meaning of the term “manifest disregard:”
Maybe the term “manifest disregard” was meant to name a new ground
for review, but maybe it merely referred to the § 10 grounds collectively,
rather than adding to them. . . . Or, as some courts have thought,
“manifest disregard” may have been shorthand for § 10(a)(3) or §
10(a)(4), the paragraphs authorizing vacatur when the arbitrators were
“guilty of misconduct” or “exceeded their powers.”93
Although the Supreme Court speculated that perhaps “the term ‘manifest disregard’
was meant to name a ground for review,”94 the Court did not suggest what that
ground might be. The Court’s omission is striking. This amorphous standard is the
John Doe of judicial review. It is a term that the Supreme Court coined without
definition or content, and yet it is a doctrine that the circuits invested with
significance and that many circuits continue to apply.
2. Other Possible Interpretations of the Wilko Dicta
There are possibilities beyond those adopted by the circuit courts that one might
reasonably extract from the ambiguous Wilko dicta. At this point, it might be
instructive to revisit that ambiguous language. The Supreme Court stated that, to be
reversible, a legal error committed by an arbitrator “would need to be made clearly
to appear.”95 The Court continued that “interpretations of the law by the arbitrators
in contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, in the federal courts, to judicial
review for error in interpretation.”96 Although the term “manifest disregard” would
awards with such errors, and suggesting that this practice complies with Hall Street and fits
into § 10 of the FAA).
89

Hall Street, 552 U.S. at 584.

90

Id. at 585.

91

Id.

92

Id.

93

Id.

94

Id.

95

Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953).

96

Id. at 436-37.
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seem not to apply to an ordinary error of law, the term might mean that the arbitrator
demonstrably failed to apply controlling law, whether the error was intentional or
not. Under this definition, “manifest” would mean “demonstrable.” Many errors
made by arbitrators are not demonstrable because arbitrators do not ordinarily
provide written opinions to support their awards.97 This lack of transparency was
prevalent when the Supreme Court decided Wilko,98 so it is quite possible that the
Wilko Court meant “demonstrable” when it used the word “manifest.” Defining
“manifest” in this way also jibes with the Court’s statement that errors must “be
made clearly to appear.”99 A judge should not guess at the grounds for an
arbitrator’s decision and vacate that decision without a clear indication of its legal
basis. “Disregard of the law,” under this definition, would mean a failure to apply
the law rather than a mistake in applying it. Such a failure might well be described
as “disregard.”
There is yet another and less restrictive interpretation that would provide a
reasonable solution to the linguistic mystery. Perhaps an arbitrator manifestly
disregards the law when he or she demonstrably (again defining “manifestly” as
“demonstrably”) commits an error of law on a point not subject to interpretation, that
is, on a point of well-settled law. This definition of manifest disregard of the law fits
the Supreme Court’s directive in Wilko that “interpretations of the law” “are not
subject, in the federal court, to judicial review . . . .”100
Defining “manifest disregard” is a pin-the-tail-on-the-donkey exercise. It is
unfortunate that controversy surrounds both the meaning and viability of such an
important legal doctrine.101 Perhaps when the Supreme Court introduced the term, it
did not contemplate that the circuit courts would elevate dicta to law, let alone to the
principal doctrine used to decide motions to vacate arbitration awards. The time is
long overdue when the high Court should announce whether manifest disregard is a
living doctrine or a mere fancy of the judicial imagination. In Hall Street, the Court
chose to keep the doctrine dangling on a tightrope, by holding that, although the
FAA provides the exclusive grounds for review, § 10 might imply the manifest
disregard standard. The Court’s equivocation has instigated another round of
confusion among the federal courts.

97

See supra note 15 and accompanying text (noting that arbitrators do not ordinarily
provide written explanations for their decisions).
98

In a dissenting opinion to the Second Circuit’s decision in Wilko, Judge Clark wrote:
“[T]he arbitrators will act according to their business background and there will be no way –
unless they volunteer foolish explanations in their decision – of checking what they do.”
Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439, 446 (1953) (Clark, J., dissenting).
99
100

Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436.
Id. at 436-37.

101

See Zachary L. Gould, Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85 (2d
Cir. 2008), 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1109, 1109 (2010) (noting that, after Hall Street,
the federal circuit courts disagree “not only on the manifest disregard doctrine’s scope but also
on its very existence.”).
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B. The Divided Reaction to Hall Street
The circuit courts are divided on whether Hall Street abolished the manifest
disregard standard.102 A circuit’s response to Hall Street has often depended on
102
Some circuit courts, in the wake of Hall Street, continue to recognize the manifest
disregard standard as a valid ground for vacating awards. See, e.g., Johnson v. Wells Fargo
Home Mortg., Inc., 635 F.3d 401, 415 n.11 (9th Cir. 2011) (reading the Supreme Court’s
decision in Stolt-Nielsen as expressing “some doubt” on whether the manifest disregard
standard survived Hall Street, but concluding that, in light of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in
Comedy Club, “in this Circuit the ‘manifest disregard’ standard has survived Hall Street
intact, and so we are bound to apply it”) (citing Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv West Assocs.,
553 F.3d 1277, 1290-91 (9th Cir. 2010)); T.Co Metals, LLC v. Dempsey Pipe & Supply, Inc.,
592 F.3d 329, 339 (2d Cir. 2010) (reaffirming the Second Circuit’s holding in Stolt-Nielsen
that the manifest disregard standard is a judicial gloss on the grounds for vacatur specified in §
10 of the FAA, and that the manifest disregard standard therefore survives Hall Street) (citing
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 94-95 (2d Cir. 2008)); Comedy
Club, 553 F.3d at 1291 (adhering to the manifest disregard standard post-Hall Street because
the standard “is a shorthand for a statutory ground under the FAA, specifically 9 U.S.C. §
10(a)(4), which states that the court may vacate where the arbitrators exceeded their powers”)
(internal quotation marks omitted); Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW, LLC, 300 Fed. App’x 415,
419 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding, in an unpublished decision, that the manifest disregard standard,
as a “judicially-invoked” ground for vacatur, continues to be viable after Hall Street because
the Supreme Court only rejected contractual expansion of the grounds in §§ 10 and 11 of the
FAA and did not address judicial expansion of those grounds). Other circuit courts have held
that Hall Street’s statutory interpretation that the grounds for vacatur in the FAA are exclusive
abolished the manifest disregard standard. See Medicine Shoppe Int’l, Inc., Turner, 614 F.3d
485, 489 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing Hall Street for the proposition that the grounds for vacatur
prescribed in § 10 are exclusive, and holding that “[a]ppellants’ claims, including the claim
that the arbitrator disregarded the law, are not included among those specifically enumerated
in § 10 and are therefore not cognizable”); Frazier v. Citifinancial Corp., LLC, 604 F.3d 1313,
1324 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that, since the manifest disregard standard was judicially
created, Hall Street abolished it by ruling that the grounds for vacatur enumerated in §§ 10
and 11 of the FAA are exclusive); Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 358
(5th Cir. 2009) (“In the light of the Supreme Court’s clear language that, under the FAA, the
statutory provisions are the exclusive grounds for vacatur, manifest disregard of the law as an
independent ground for setting aside an award must be abandoned and rejected.”). Still other
circuit courts have commented on the issue without deciding whether Hall Street invalidated
the manifest disregard standard. See Hicks v. The Cadle Co., 355 Fed. App’x 186, 197 (10th
Cir. 2009) (viewing the manifest disregard standard as judicially created, but declining to
decide whether Hall Street abolished it because the defendants failed to meet the manifest
disregard standard in their motion to vacate the award); Ramos-Santiago v. United Parcel
Serv., 524 F.3d 120, 124 (1st Cir. 2008) (acknowledging that Hall Street invalidated the
manifest disregard standard, but declining to follow it because the case was brought under
Puerto Rican law, not the FAA); UMass Mem’l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. United Food and
Commercial Workers Union, 527 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2008) (stating that courts have inherent
powers, outside of § 10, to vacate awards). In Grain v. Trinity Health, Mercy Health Servs.
Inc., the Sixth Circuit noted that it had previously characterized the manifest disregard
standard as “judicially created.” 551 F.3d 374, 379-80 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Jaros Inc., 70 F.3d 418, 421 (6th Cir. 1995)), cert. denied, 130 S.
Ct. 96 (2009). Although it declined to rule on the continued viability of the manifest disregard
standard, it recognized, contrary to its previous decision in Coffee Beanery, that “Hall Street’s
reference to the ‘exclusive’ statutory grounds for obtaining relief casts some doubt on the
continuing vitality of that theory.” Grain, 551 F.3d at 380.
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whether the circuit viewed the manifest disregard standard as statutory or
nonstatutory.103 As shown below, there have been three positions taken among those
circuits that have reached definitive decisions.
1. Manifest Disregard as a Nonstatutory Ground of Review
In Citigroup Global Markets Inc. v. Bacon,104 the Fifth Circuit held that Hall
Street abolished the manifest disregard standard.105 Although the Fifth Circuit, prior
to the Bacon case, had adopted the manifest disregard standard as a nonstatutory
ground of review, it recognized the dubious origins of the doctrine:
Our circuit did not accept manifest disregard of the law as a nonstatutory
ground for vacatur with immediate confidence and certainty. . . . Indeed,
manifest disregard of the law does not have a compelling origin as a
ground for vacatur. Its modest debut occurs in a vague phrase found in
Wilko v. Swan . . . .106
The Fifth Circuit noted that Hall Street held that the grounds for vacatur prescribed
in the FAA are exclusive.107 Because the Fifth Circuit had classified manifest
disregard as a nonstatutory ground, it concluded that manifest disregard of the law
was no longer a basis to vacate arbitration awards.108
Coffee Beanery Ltd. v. WW L.L.C,109 an unpublished decision of the Sixth
Circuit, conflicts with Bacon.110 Although conceding that Hall Street “significantly
reduced” the viability of the nonstatutory grounds for vacatur of arbitration, the Sixth
Circuit concluded nonetheless that Hall Street did not eliminate them.111 To exempt
the manifest disregard standard from Hall Street’s pronouncement that the grounds
for vacatur in the FAA are exclusive, the Sixth Circuit stressed that Hall Street
rejected contractual rather than judicial expansion of the scope of review.112
103
Compare Johnson, 635 F.3d at 401, 415 n. 11 (confirming the Ninth Circuit’s
recognition of the manifest disregard standard after Hall Street and Stolt-Nielsen because
manifest disregard is a “shorthand” for § 10(a)(4) of the FAA) and T.Co Metals, 592 F.3d at
339 (reaffirming the Second Circuit’s position that the manifest disregard standard is a
“judicial gloss” on the grounds for vacatur specified in § 10 of the FAA) with Medicine
Shoppe, 614 F.3d at 489 (holding that Hall Street abolished manifest disregard, which was a
nonstatutory ground for vacatur) and Frazier, 604 F.3d at 1324 (ruling that, since the manifest
disregard standard was judicially created, Hall Street abolished it).
104

Citigroup Global Markets Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349 (5th Cir. 2009).

105

Id. at 358.

106

Id. at 354. See Williams v. Cigna Fin. Advisors, Inc., 197 F.3d 752, 759 (5th Cir. 1999)
(recognizing the manifest disregard standard as a nonstatutory ground of review in light of the
First Options decision).
107

Citigroup, 562 F.3d at 355.

108

Id.

109

Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW, LLC, 300 F. App’x. 415 (6th Cir. 2008).

110

Id. at 418-19.

111

Id.

112

Id.
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Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit observed that “manifest disregard”—a narrow
standard of review—comported with Hall Street’s disapproval of general review for
arbitration awards.113 The Sixth Circuit seized upon Hall Street’s suggestion that the
vague language in Wilko might have “meant to name a new ground for review”
outside the grounds expressed in §§ 10 and 11 of the FAA.114 Given that all the
circuits had adopted the manifest disregard standard before the Hall Street decision,
the Sixth Circuit concluded that “it would be imprudent to cease employing such a
universally recognized principle.”115
2. Manifest Disregard as a Statutory Ground of Review
In Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv West Associates,116 the Ninth Circuit considered
whether the manifest disregard standard, which it had long recognized as a statutory
ground for review, survived Hall Street.117 The court noted that it had held
previously that the manifest disregard standard is a “shorthand” for § 10(a)(4) of the
FAA, the subsection authorizing the vacatur for awards “where the arbitrators
exceeded their powers.”118 The Hall Street decision, the Ninth Circuit observed, had
not decided whether § 10(a)(4) of the FAA implied the manifest disregard standard
of review.119 Nevertheless, Hall Street had listed this possibility among several
viable interpretations of Wilko’s seminal language, which gave birth to the standard.

113

Id.

114
Id. at 419 (quoting Hall Street Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 585 (2008)).
The Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of Hall Street is implausible. The court’s principal point
was that Hall Street speculated that Wilko might have meant the term “‘manifest disregard’ to
name a new ground for review.” Coffee Beanery, 300 Fed. App’x at 419 (6th Cir. 2008). The
Supreme Court’s speculation about what Wilko might have meant does not imply that the
Court would agree with Wilko if Wilko intended to create a ground for review not prescribed
in the FAA. Hall Street was unequivocal that the grounds specified in §§ 10 and 11 are
exclusive. If dicta in Wilko meant to suggest that manifest disregard of the law was a creature
of judicial invention rather than one of statutory construction, the dicta in Wilko would violate
the holding of Hall Street. The Wilko dicta would therefore not be entitled to any weight.
115

Coffee Beanery, 300 Fed.Appx. at 419.

116

Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv West Associates, 553 F.3d 1277 (9th Cir. 2009).

117

Id. at 1290; see also Johnson v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc., 635 F.3d 401, 415 n.
11 (9th Cir. 2011) (reaffirming that in the Ninth Circuit the manifest disregard standard has
survived Hall Street).
118

Comedy Club, 553 F.3d at 1290 (citing Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade
Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 997 (9th Cir 2003) (en banc) (holding that arbitrators exceed their
powers when their decisions are completely irrational or when the arbitrators manifestly
disregard the law)). Accord Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.2d 85, 95
(2d Cir. 2008) (holding that FAA § 10(a)(4) implies the manifest disregard standard because it
includes, as a ground for judicial review of arbitration awards, a finding that the arbitrators
“exceeded their powers”).
119

Comedy Club, 553 F.3d at 1290.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2012

19

106

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:87

Since established Ninth Circuit precedent was not “clearly irreconcilable”120 with
Hall Street, the Ninth Circuit held the manifest disregard standard viable.121
IV. THE SUPREME COURT’S LAPSE INTO SELF-CONTRADICTION
It is stunning that between Wilko, a 1953 decision arguably establishing the
manifest disregard standard, and First Options, a 1995 decision arguably confirming
the viability of that standard, the Supreme Court issued two opinions declaring that
certain arbitral awards are subject to plenary review for errors of law. The decisions
recognizing plenary review cannot be reconciled with the manifest disregard
standard. The clash between the two standards is—manifest. To understand why the
Supreme Court lapsed into self-contradiction, one must trace the evolution of
arbitration policy.
A. Judicial Hostility Toward Arbitration Agreements
Before passage of the FAA, the widespread perception among businesspersons
and legislators was that American common law courts, as a rule, refused to enforce
arbitration agreements.122 Though perhaps exaggerated,123 the perception of judicial
hostility toward arbitration had support in case law.124 The courts’ rationale for this
120
Id. at 1290 (citing Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc)
(holding that Ninth Circuit precedent will stand unless “clearly irreconcilable” with a Supreme
Court ruling)).
121

Id. at 1290; accord Johnson v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc., 635 F.3d 401, 415 n.
11 (9th Cir. 2011) (reaffirming that in the Ninth Circuit the manifest disregard standard has
survived Hall Street).
122

H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, To Validate Certain Agreements for Arbitration, at 1-2 (1924)
(hereinafter “House Report 1924”) (“The need for the new law arises from an anachronism of
our American law. Some centuries ago, because of the jealousy of the English courts for their
jurisdiction, they refused to enforce specific agreements to arbitrate upon the ground that the
courts were thereby ousted from their jurisdiction. This jealousy survived so long a period
that the principle became firmly embedded in the English common law and was adopted with
it by the American courts.”); Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Hearings on
H.R. 646 and S. 1005 before the Joint Committee of Subcommittees on the Judiciary, 68th
Cong., at 14 (1924) (hereinafter “Hearings 1924”) (statement of Julius Henry Cohen) (“The
difficulty is that men do enter into such [arbitration] agreements and then afterwards repudiate
the agreement, and the difficulty has been that for over 300 years…the courts have said that
that kind of an agreement was one that was revocable at any time. You go in and watch the
expression on the face of your arbitrator and you have a ‘hunch’ that he is against you, and
you withdraw and say, ‘I don’t believe in arbitration anymore.’”)
123

See Michael H. LeRoy, Crowning the New King: The Statutory Arbitrator and the
Demise of Judicial Review, 2009 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 17 (2009) (commenting that, although
some English courts invoked the ouster-of-jurisdiction doctrine to thwart arbitration, English
courts generally enforced arbitration agreements); Paul L. Sayre, The Development of
Commercial Arbitration Law, 37 YALE L.J. 595, 603-04 (1928) (expressing doubt that English
courts were hostile to arbitration, since the prevalent practice was to secure damages for
breach of the arbitration agreement through a bond); see, e.g., Vynior’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep.
597 (1609) (requiring a party who had posted a bond to pay damages for breaching an
arbitration agreement).
124
See, e.g., Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. 445, 451 (1874) (declaring that “[a] man may not
barter away his life or his freedom, or his substantial rights,” and that “agreements in advance
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hostility – the ouster of jurisdiction doctrine – originated in eighteenth century
English common law.125 Protective of their power to decide cases, English courts
sometimes voiced suspicion about the adequacy of the arbitral process to protect the
rights of parties.126 In Scott v. Avery,127 for example, Baron Martin commented that
“[u]pon the award being made, unless the arbitrators have been guilty of fraud, the
courts have no power to inquire whether the arbitrators have awarded rightly or
wrongly, according to law or against it.”128 The ouster-of-jurisdiction doctrine
migrated to the United States where many criticized the doctrine for thwarting
arbitration.129
Congress passed the FAA to end the judiciary’s resistance to enforcing
arbitration agreements.130 Section § 2 of the FAA achieves this goal by providing
that arbitration agreements are “valid, enforceable, and irrevocable.”131 Yet, after
passage of the FAA, Wilko refused to allow the arbitration of § 12(2) securities fraud
claims.132 The Supreme Court’s distrust of arbitration was reminiscent of the
hostility expressed by English courts when invoking the ouster-of-jurisdiction
doctrine.

to oust the courts of the jurisdiction conferred by law are illegal and void.”); Leo Kanowitz,
Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Public Interest: The Arbitration Experience, 38
HASTINGS L.J. 239, 252 (1987) (“In the past, although courts generally enforced arbitrators’
awards, they refused to grant specific performance of executory agreements to arbitrate future
disputes.”).
125

See, e.g., Kill v. Hollister, 1 Wils. 129 (1746) (holding that “the agreement of the parties
cannot oust this court”). See generally Kenneth R. Davis, The Arbitration Claws:
Unconscionability in the Securities Industry, 78 B.U.L. REV. 255, 261-63 (providing a history
and analysis of English cases espousing the ouster-of-jurisdiction doctrine).
126

Scott v. Avery, 10 Eng. Rep. 1121, 5 S.C.(H.L.) 811, 841 (1856) (opinion by Coleridge,
J.) (“The courts will not enforce or sanction an agreement which deprives the subject of that
recourse to their jurisdiction, which has been considered a right inalienable even by the
concurrent will of the parties.”)
127

Id.

128

Id. at 829 (opinion of Martin, J.).

129

See Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 474 (1989)
(remarking that Congress enacted the FAA to overcome the judiciary’s refusal to enforce
arbitration agreements) (citing Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-220
(1985)); Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 982-84 (2d Cir.
1942) (mocking the “hypnotic effect” of the ouster-of-jurisdiction doctrine); United States
Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petrol. Co., 222 F. 1006, 1009 (S.D.N.Y. 1915) (criticizing
the courts for applying the ouster-of-jurisdiction doctrine); House Report 1924, supra note
122, at 2 (“If one party is recalcitrant he can no longer escape his agreement, [and] [a]t the
same time the party willing to perform his contract for arbitration is not subject to the delay
and cost of litigation”).
130
See, e.g., Allied Bruce Terminix, Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 271 (1995) (noting that
the purpose of the FAA is to put arbitration agreements “upon the same footing as other
contracts”) (quoting Volt, 489 U.S. at 474).
131

9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).

132

Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953).
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B. A Change of Policy
After Wilko, the Supreme Court began to rethink its distrust of arbitration until
the Court changed its viewpoint and arbitration had the Court’s unqualified support.
In Moses H. Cone v. Mercury Constr. Corp.133 the Court announced that “[s]ection 2
is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration
agreements.”134 Recognizing this policy, the Court in Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v.
Byrd135 observed that “[t]he prominent concern of Congress in passing the Act was
to enforce private arbitration agreements . . . [which] requires that we rigorously
enforce agreements to arbitrate.”136 Confirming this policy shift, a series of
decisions declared virtually all federal statutory claims arbitrable. The Court applied
its pro-arbitration policy to allow the arbitration of federal claims brought under antitrust law, securities law, anti-racketeering law, and civil rights law.137
These decisions required the Court to address the standard of judicial review of
awards because Wilko’s refusal to allow the arbitration of § 12(2) rested largely on
the Court’s concern over inadequate review.138 The Supreme Court had two choices.
It could either renounce its concern that arbitrators might commit legal error that
would not be subject to judicial correction, or it could adopt a broader standard of
judicial review to safeguard the rights of those submitting federal claims to
arbitrators. The Court followed the second alternative, but only by resorting to more
dicta, which regrettably has not supplanted the entrenched dicta of Wilko.139
1. McMahon and Gilmer: The Shift Toward Expanded Review
The Supreme Court decided Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon140 in
1987, over three decades after Wilko. The McMahons had a brokerage account at
Shearson, which contained a standard arbitration agreement.141 Alleging securities
fraud under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, the McMahons sued Shearson

133

Moses H. Cone v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 (1982).

134

Id. at 24.

135

Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985).

136

Id. at 221. See Maureen A. Weston, The Supreme Court and Arbitration: The Other
Avenues of Hall Street and Prospects for Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, 14 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 929, 930 (2010) (commenting that the Supreme Court, over the past 30 years,
has adopted a pro-arbitration policy and supports upholding party intent expressed in
arbitration agreements).
137

See Part IV.B.1 (discussing Supreme Court cases that expanded the arbitrability of
federal statutory claims).
138

Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 437 (1953).

139

See Part IV.B.1 (discussing decisions permitting the arbitration of a variety of federal
claims).
140

Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).

141

Id. at 222-23.
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and their account representative in federal court.142 The defendants moved to compel
arbitration.143
The Court was dismissive of Wilko’s distrust of arbitration.144 It had already
upheld the arbitrability of antitrust claims145 and § 10(b) securities fraud claim in an
international context, 146 and it seemed eager to extend this rule to § 10(b) claims
generally.147 The Court, however, was obliged to reconcile the arbitrability of §
10(b) securities fraud claims with Wilko’s objection to that the scope of judicial
review is insufficient to protect the rights of victims of securities fraud.148
Upholding arbitrability while reaffirming ineffectual judicial review would have
been untenable. The Court resolved this problem by issuing bold dicta that
contradicted its notorious dicta in Wilko. The Court declared: “[W]e have indicated
that there is no reason to assume at the outset that arbitrators will not follow the law;
although judicial scrutiny of arbitration awards necessarily is limited, such review is
sufficient to ensure that arbitrators comply with the requirements of the statute.”149
Reviewing awards for errors of law is far broader than the standard expressed in
Wilko, which forecloses review for an arbitrator’s “error in interpretation.”150
Four years after McMahon, in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,151 the
Court held claims brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
arbitrable.152
Gilmer, age 62, was a manager of financial services for
Interstate/Johnson Lane.153 As a condition of his employment, he signed an
arbitration agreement.154 When Interstate terminated his employment, he brought an
action in federal district court, alleging age discrimination.155 Interstate moved to
compel arbitration.156 Gilmer argued that “judicial review of arbitration decisions is

142

Id.

143

Id.

144

Id. at 233.

145

Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 515-20 (1974) (holding arbitrable a
securities claim brought by a Delaware corporation against a German national).
146
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler-Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 638 (1985)
(holding that a Sherman Act antitrust claim alleged by a Puerto Rico corporation against a
Japanese and a Swiss corporation was arbitrable).
147

Shearson/American Express Inc v. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 220, 232-33 (1987).

148

See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953).

149

Shearson/American Express Inc., 482 U.S. at 232.

150

Wilko, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37.

151

Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).

152

Id. at 23.

153

Id.

154

Id.

155

Id. at 23-24.

156

Id. at 24.
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too limited” to protect victimized older workers from erroneous arbitral decisions.157
Suggesting that it had resolved this concern in McMahon, the Court relegated this
point to a footnote, quoting McMahon’s assurance that reviewing courts will enforce
the requirements of the statute.158 No further comment was needed.
2. Expedience over Principle
The First Options case was decided in 1995, after both McMahon and Gilmer.159
It might seem odd that the Court, having endorsed expanded review in McMahon
and Gilmer, reverted to the manifest disregard standard in First Options.160 The
reason for the Supreme Court’s fickleness might simply be explained by the cynical
observation that, in each case from Wilko to First Options, the Court espoused the
standard of review that provided the handiest justification for its ruling. In Wilko,
the Court ruled against allowing the arbitration of § 12(2) securities fraud claims.161
The absence of meaningful substantive review supported the decision.162 McMahon
and Gilmer conflicted with Wilko by allowing the arbitration of § 10(b) claims,
RICO claims, and ADEA claims.163 Part of the Court’s rationale for allowing the
arbitration of these federal statutory claims was the availability of plenary court
review for errors of law.164 In First Options, the Court held that, under the facts of
the case, the question of arbitrability was for the court to decide.165 To assign the
question of arbitrability to the arbitrator, the Court ruled, required clear and
unmistakable evidence of party intent.166 The Supreme Court justified this holding
by noting the narrowness of the scope of judicial review. Like any issue submitted
for arbitration, once the question of arbitrability is submitted to an arbitrator “the
court will set [the arbitrator’s] decision aside only in very unusual circumstances.”167
3. Synthesis
Though expedience apparently influenced the Court, a valid policy concern
unifies all four decisions. Wilko, McMahon, Gilmer and First Options all agree that
a narrow scope of judicial review of awards deciding federal statutory rights is
inadequate. Where federal statutory rights are arbitrated, whether they arise under
157

Id. at 32, n.4.

158

Id.

159

First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995).

160

Id. at 942 (referring with approval to the manifest disregard standard).

161

Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953).

162

Id. at 436.

163

Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991) (approving the
arbitrability of ADEA claims); Shearson American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220,
238 (1987) (approving the arbitrability of Securities Exchange Act § 10(b) claims); McMahon,
482 U.S. at 242 (approving the arbitrability of RICO claims).
164

McMahon, 482 U.S. at 232; Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32 n.4.

165

First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995).

166

Id. at 944.

167

Id. at 942.
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the securities laws, civil rights law, or other federal statutes, courts need to apply a
rigorous standard of review to ensure that those rights are protected. Thus, in Wilko
and First Options, where the Court directed the cases to the judicial system, the
Court justified its decisions by stating that limited judicial review would be
inadequate to protect the statutory rights at stake. In McMahon and Gilmer, where
the Court directed the cases to arbitration, the Court insisted the level of scrutiny
sufficient to protect the parties’ statutory rights. The Court’s concern for ensuring
the enforcement of federal rights animates its pronouncements on the scope of
review.
4. Reactions of the Lower Courts
Many federal court decisions have reflected the concern to protect federal rights,
either openly employing the broad standard of review espoused in McMahon and
Gilmer, or refusing implicitly to apply the narrow manifest disregard standard.168
The D.C. Circuit, for example, has applied the broad standard of judicial review
adopted in McMahon and confirmed in Gilmer to awards resolving Title VII claims.
In Cole v. Burns International Security Service,169 Cole was a security guard
working at Union Station in Washington, D.C. for LaSalle and Partners.170 Burns
Security took over the Union Station contract and required all La Salle employees,
including Cole, to sign an arbitration agreement covering discrimination claims.171
When Burns Security fired Cole two years later, he sued the company in federal
court for racial discrimination. Burns Security moved to compel arbitration.172
Cole argued that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable because the scope
of judicial review provided by the manifest disregard test was too lax to safeguard
his Title VII rights.173 The court disagreed, holding that, when arbitrators resolve
civil rights claims, courts should review awards for errors of law.174 In so holding,
the D.C. Circuit relied on Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc.,175 a Supreme Court case which held that Sherman Act antitrust cases, in an
international context, are arbitrable.176 The Cole court found the following passage
from Mitsubishi persuasive: “By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does
not forego the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their

168
See infra notes 169-93 and accompanying text (discussing how some federal courts
have balked at applying the manifest disregard standard).
169

Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Serv., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

170

Id. at 1469.

171

Id.

172

Id. at 1470.

173

Id. at 1486.

174

Id. at 1487.

175

Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985). See
also Rodrigues de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 486 (1989)
(noting that “resort to the arbitration process does not inherently undermine any of the
substantive rights afforded to the petitioners under the Securities Act.”).
176

Id. at 640.
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resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.”177 Standing alone, this quote
from Mitsubishi does not necessarily imply a plenary standard of review. The quote
might simply mean that arbitrators should follow applicable statutory provisions,
even though awards are not reviewable. The D.C. Circuit eliminated this possibility
by quoting McMahon’s assurance that judicial review “is sufficient to ensure that
arbitrators comply with the requirements of the statute.”178 Merging Wilko and
McMahon, the D.C. Circuit held that, in Title VII cases, the manifest disregard
standard means unrestricted substantive review.179
The D.C. Circuit was right to rely on McMahon. It had no reason, however, to
practice verbal alchemy, transforming “manifest disregard,” which, according to
Wilko, forecloses review for an “error in interpretation,”180 into judicial review for
errors of law. The D.C. Circuit should simply have stated that manifest disregard is
not the correct standard to apply to Title VII cases.
Other courts have strayed from Wilko, stretching the meaning of “manifest
disregard” to encompass unintentional errors.181 These courts, though claiming
adherence to the manifest disregard standard, seem to apply a “knew or should have
known” test for reviewing arbitral errors.182 The explanation for this subterfuge is
probably that some judges wince at the prospect of confirming a decision that would
deprive a plaintiff of a federal right, whether arising out of civil rights law, securities
law, or another federal statute. They simply must intervene. Murmurs of rebellion

177

Id. at 628.

178

Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Serv., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting Shearson
American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 232 (1987)).
179

Cole, 105 F.3d at 1487; contra DiRussa v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 121 F.3d 818,
821-22 (1997) (rejecting Cole’s position that plenary judicial review should apply to
arbitration awards construing federal statutory rights).
180

Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953).

181

See, e.g., Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv West Assoc., 553 F.3d 1277, 1293 (9th Cir.
2009) (vacating arbitrator’s award for misconstruing controlling precedent limiting the scope
of in-term non-compete covenants); Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW, L.L.C., 300 Fed. Appx.
415, 420 (6th Cir. 2008) (vacating arbitrator’s award because it improperly failed to find that
the non-disclosure of a felony conviction violated the Maryland Franchise Act.); DiRussa v.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 121 F.3d 818, 822-23 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 695
(1998) (denying motion to vacate because “at no point did DiRussa communicate . . . to the
arbitrators that the ADEA mandated such an award [of attorneys’ fees] to a prevailing
party.”); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Jaros, 70 F.3d 418, 421 (6th Cir. 1995)
(holding that arbitrators manifestly disregard the law when they adopt a line of legal
reasoning that no judge could reasonably defend); DeGaetano v. Smith Barney, Inc., 983 F.
Supp. 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (vacating arbitration panel’s award because the panel erroneously
denied attorney’s fees to a prevailing complainant in a Title VII sexual harassment case). In
Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 204 (2d Cir. 1998), the Second Circuit went
even further by vacating an arbitration award that denied a federal age discrimination claim
because the arbitrators ignored “the law or the evidence or both.”
182

See, e.g., DiRussa, 121 F.3d at 822-23 (2d Cir. 1997) (suggesting that if plaintiff had
either explained to the arbitration panel that the ADEA mandates the award of attorney’s fees
to a prevailing party or quoted the relevant ADEA section, the panel’s denial of an award of
attorney’s fees to plaintiff would have manifestly disregarded the law).
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against the manifest disregard standard have been heard for years in some quarters of
the federal judiciary.
For example, in DeGaetano v. Smith Barney, Inc.,183 DeGaetano commenced
arbitration before the New York Stock Exchange, alleging sexual harassment against
Smith Barney, her former employer, and against her former supervisor.184 She
submitted a memorandum of law to the arbitration panel in which she asserted that,
if she prevailed on her sexual harassment claim, the panel was obligated to award her
attorneys’ fees.185 The panel awarded DeGaetano over $90,000 in damages and
interest, but it denied her attorneys’ fees.186 The panel stated that it did “not find that
the conduct of the Respondents rose to the level contemplated by Title VII and
therefore [the panel] den[ied] the requests for punitive damages and attorney’s
fees.”187
Ruling on DeGaetano’s motion to vacate that part of the award denying her
attorneys’ fees, Judge Cote faithfully recited the definition of the manifest disregard
test and then abandoned it.188 Judge Cote observed that DeGaetano was incorrect
when she instructed the panel that, under Title VII, a prevailing party is entitled to
attorney’s fees, because awarding attorney’s fees is discretionary, not mandatory.189
Nevertheless, Judge Cote noted that plaintiffs in Title VII cases “ordinarily” recover
attorneys’ fees “unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust.”190
Judge Cote concluded that there were no special circumstances justifying the panel’s
denial of DeGaetano’s request for attorney’s fees.191 The panel, according to her,
confused the generous standard for awarding attorneys’ fees with the more stringent
standard for awarding punitive damages.192 Judge Cote therefore held that this error
amounted to manifest disregard of the law.193
This decision is hard to reconcile with the traditional manifest disregard standard.
DeGaetano had misinformed the panel that she was entitled as a matter of law to
attorneys’ fees. Perhaps the panel felt that her misstatement of the law constituted
“special circumstances” to deny such an award. Alternatively, if the panel did
confuse the standard for awarding attorneys’ fees with the standard for awarding
punitive damages, as Judge Cote concluded, the panel did not intentionally ignore
the law. Judge Cote may have claimed fidelity to the manifest disregard standard,
but she applied a “knew or should have known” test, which came perilously close to
plenary review for errors of law.
183

DeGaetano, 983 F. Supp. 459.

184

Id. at 460.

185

Id. at 461.

186

Id.

187

Id.

188

Id. at 461-62.

189

Id.

190

Id. (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983).

191

Id. at 462.

192

Id. at 463-64.

193

Id.
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Judge Cote, however, deserves no criticism. Tacit rejections of the manifest
disregard standard are welcome. The evolution of arbitration since the passage of
the FAA demands broadening the role of judicial oversight.
C. The Purpose of the FAA
Before the passage of the FAA in 1925, arbitration was, for the most part, a
process to resolve contract disputes between merchants.194 The principal architect of
the FAA, Julius Henry Cohen described the FAA as a “great tonic” for those
engaged “in the field of commercial activity.”195 The primary purpose of the FAA
was to provide a method of dispute resolution for merchants and businessmen that
would be less costly and less time-consuming than litigation. Urging passage of the
FAA, Charles Bernheimer, chairman of the committee on arbitration of the New
York State Chamber of commerce, testified, “The most unprofitable thing the
merchant and business man, or anyone engaged in buying and selling, can have
confront him is that of litigation.”196
The trend away from the courthouse and toward arbitration gained momentum in
the early twentieth century. Arbitration met the needs of those involved in trade
disputes, since customs, known to arbitrators with experience in the relevant
industry, often provided the preferred rule of decision.197 It is not surprising that by
1920 “trade associations . . . [frequently] . . . require[d] their members to submit their
disputes to arbitration . . . .”198
Because customs replaced law and industry experts replaced judges, the need to
review arbitration awards for substantive legal error was minimal.199 The framers of
the FAA, however, could not have foreseen the widespread use of arbitration to
resolve federal statutory claims. While limited judicial review is appropriate for
194

See, e.g., E. Gerli & Co. v. Oscar Heineman Corp., 258 N.Y. 484, 485-86 (1932)
(confirming award that quality of silk delivered to merchant buyer was sub-standard); Red
Cross Line v. United Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109 (1924) (alleging that a steamship operator
breached a charter party by unreasonably delaying performance); Itoh & Co. v. Boyer Oil Co.,
191 N.Y. Supp. 290 (1921) (refusing to vacate award finding that the quality of hemp seed
shipped to buyer was acceptable); Philip G. Phillips, Legislation and Administration, 1 U. CHI.
L. REV. 424, 429 (1934) [hereinafter “Legislation and Administration”]; Philip G. Phillips,
Rules of Law or Laissez-Faire in Commercial Arbitration, 47 HARV. L. REV. 590, 596-603
(1934) [hereinafter “Rules of Law”] (listing categories of business claims arbitrated before
passage of the FAA); Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Joint Hearing on S.
1005 and H.R. 646 Before the Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 10 (1924)
(statement of W.H.H. Piatt testifying, “Men have found that if they must arbitrate at once they
proceed to carry out their contracts.”).
195

Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Joint Hearing on S. 1005 and H.R. 646
Before the Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 16 (1924) (testimony of
Julius Henry Cohen).
196

Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Joint Hearing on S. 1005 and H.R. 646
Before the Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 6 (1924) (testimony of
Charles L. Bernheimer).
197

See Legislation and Administration, supra note 194, at 426-27.

198

Rules of Law, supra note 194, at 590.

199

Id.
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contract claims, the adequacy of limited review for federal statutory claims is
dubious. As Justice Clark observed, “Commercial arbitration has been highly
successful in bringing a businessman’s adjudication to business questions. But it
would be vastly unfortunate if it became usable as a device to blunt or break social
legislation.”200
When Congress passed the FAA, it could not have imagined the type, the range,
and the volume of federal statutory claims that would, as a matter of common
practice, find their way to arbitration. In 1925, Congress had not yet passed any
federal securities law. Neither the Securities Act of 1933,201 nor the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934202 existed, and there was no Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority (FINRA) to administer the thousands of securities arbitrations that are
heard every year in its hearing rooms.203 There was no 1964 Civil Rights Act,204 no
Age Discrimination in Employment Act,205 and no Americans with Disabilities
Act.206 RICO, the anti-racketeering law, was still 45 years away.207
One policy of the FAA was to provide an efficient method of dispute resolution
for business.208 Efficiency meant distancing the courts from the process. To achieve
this separation, the FAA established a narrow scope of judicial review, which
prescribed nullification of awards for “fraud or other corruption or undue influence,
or [for] some evident mistake not affecting the merits . . . .”209 But the decision to
limit the scope of review to issues of gross procedural unfairness was based on the
understanding that arbitration was an economical method to resolve disputes
involving merchants belonging to trade associations, and between others in the
business of buying and selling goods and services. Congress could not have
contemplated that the FAA would govern the arbitration of women harassed by the
200

Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439, 445 (2d. Cir. 1953) (Clark, J., dissenting).

201

Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (2006).

202

Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78pp (2006).

203

The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc. (“FINRA”), the only self-regulatory
organization for the securities industry, operates the largest dispute resolution forum providing
mediation and arbitration services for claims between and among investors, securities firms,
and registered representatives. See FINRA, ARBITRATION & MEDIATION (2012),
http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/index.htm.
There were 7,137 arbitration cases filed with FINRA in 2009. FINRA, FINRA Dispute
Resolution,
ARBITRATION
&
MEDIATION
(Jan.
27,
2011),
http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/FINRADisputeResolution/AdditionalResource
s/Statistics/. In 2010, there were 5,680 filings. Id. As of December 2011, there were 4,729
filings. Id.
204

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000h-6 (2006).

205

Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2006).

206

Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006).

207

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2006).

208

See supra note 196 and accompanying text (discussing the FAA policy to promote
efficiency).
209

H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, 2 (1924) (report of Congressman Graham from the Committee on
the Judiciary).
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sexual conduct of their supervisors, or of retirees wiped out by unscrupulous
stockbrokers who gambled funds in Ponzi schemes. One must question whether a
civil rights claim of a black worker, fired because of his race, should be
unreviewable if the arbitrator denied the claim because he erroneously applied the
McDonnell Douglas210 framework to the exclusion of the more plaintiff-friendly
motivating factor test approved in Costa for all individual disparate treatment
cases.211 One must question whether an erroneous award denying a § 10(b)
securities fraud claim should stand because a shrewd lawyer convinced a panel of
arbitrators that the statute of limitations in § 804 of Sarbanes-Oxley did not apply to
claims brought under the Securities Exchange Act.212
D. Policy Considerations
Applying plenary review for errors of law when a federally protected right is
asserted reconciles the pro-arbitration policy of the FAA and the policies of federal
statutes that protect substantive rights. This approach permits the arbitration of
claims asserting such rights, while protecting those rights with adequate review. In
addition, the approach taken in McMahon and Gilmer advances the FAA policy of
honoring party intent. When parties agree to arbitrate a federal statutory right, they
reasonably expect that right to be protected. The federal courts should honor that
expectation.
Efficiency is also a hallmark of arbitration.213 This policy, however, sometimes
conflicts with the policy promoting party intent. An expansive level of judicial
review for awards deciding federal claims would, to some extent, decrease
efficiency. In Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd,214 the Supreme Court seemed to
resolve this conflict of policies in favor of party intent. The Supreme Court
emphasized in Byrd: “We therefore reject the suggestion that the overriding goal of
the Arbitration Act was to promote the expeditious resolution of claims.”215 The
210

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973) (establishing the
three-step burden-shifting framework for deciding individual disparate treatment cases).
211
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98-99 (2003) (holding that the mixed-motive
analysis prescribed in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) applies to cases based on circumstantial
evidence). Suppose, for example, that an arbitrator believes that he or she must choose
between the McDonnell Douglas framework and the mixed-motive framework to determine
the validity of a claim. The arbitrator applies the McDonnell Douglas framework because the
plaintiff focused primarily on disproving the defendant’s non-discriminatory explanation.
Finding that the plaintiff has failed to disprove the defendant’s non-discriminatory
explanation, the arbitrator rules against the plaintiff, although there is strong evidence that the
plaintiff could have met the motivating-factor test based on flagrantly racist statements that his
supervisor made after firing him.
212

28 U.S.C. § 1658(b) (2006) (providing that securities fraud claims may be brought
within five years of the violation but no longer than two years after discovery). Before the
passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, federal securities law claims had to be brought within three years
of the violation but no longer than one year after discovery. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(f). See Lampf v.
Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 364 n.9 (1991).
213
See supra note 196 and accompanying text (discussing the FAA policy to promote
efficiency).
214

Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985).

215

Id. at 219.
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Court went on to declare, “the Act was motivated, first and foremost, by a
congressional desire to enforce agreements into which parties had entered, and we
must not overlook this principal objective when construing the statute, or allow the
fortuitous impact of the Act on efficient dispute resolution of overshadow the
underlying motivation.”216 In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,217 however, the
Court retreated from its statement in Byrd, declaring that it is “greatly misleading” to
argue that Byrd recognized party intent as the primary policy of the FAA.218 Once
again the Supreme Court contradicted itself.
Even if the policy favoring efficiency is placed on a par with the policy favoring
party intent, the two policies may be reconciled. The diminution in efficiency
occasioned by implementing the standard of review suggested in McMahon and
Gilmer is not a serious one. Efficiency arises from numerous other features of
arbitration such as relaxed pleading requirements and evidentiary rules, limited
discovery and motion practice, and an expedited hearing schedule. Other features of
arbitration such as the parties’ contractual control over the proceedings, privacy,
confidentiality, and arbitrator expertise—which are all reasons that motivate parties
to arbitrate—are untouched by expanded review. 219 It should be noted too that,
while applying the manifest disregard standard, courts routinely analyze the
principles of controlling law and sometimes delve into the hearing record to
determine whether the arbitrator committed an error justifying vacatur. If awards
deciding federal statutory claims were subjected to plenary review for errors of law,
the augmented role of the judiciary would not be as daunting as some might fear.220
216

Id. at 220.

217

AT&T Mobility LLC. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).

218

Id. at 1749. The Supreme Court in Hall Street also minimized Byrd’s unequivocal
endorsement of party intent as the FAA’s dominant policy. The Court stated, “Despite the
[Byrd] opinion’s language ‘reject[ing] the suggestion that the overriding goal of the [FAA]
was to promote the expeditious resolution of claims’ the holding mandated immediate
enforcement of an arbitration agreement; the Court was merely trying to explain that the
inefficiency and difficulty of conducting simultaneous arbitration and federal-court litigation
was not a good enough reason to defer the arbitration.” Hall Street Assocs., LLC v. Mattel,
Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 588 (2008). The Court’s protestations amount to judicial hocus pocus.
Even while attempting to diffuse the policy statement in Byrd, the Hall Street Court
strengthened it. As the Hall Street Court conceded, the rationale for “conducting simultaneous
arbitration and federal-court litigation” was the primacy of the policy of honoring party intent
rather than the policy of promoting efficiency.
219
Professor Tom Ginsburg believes that “[p]arties will always be unwilling to arbitrate
under a regime of de novo review, because it confers no advantages over going directly to
court.” Tom Ginsburg, The Arbitrator as Agent: Why Deferential Review Is Not Always ProArbitration, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1013, 1025 (2010). He does agree, however, that parties “will
also be reluctant to arbitrate if the arbitrator is unlikely to resolve their dispute according to
the agreed-upon law.” Id.
220
Scholars, while generally critical of the manifest disregards standard, have debated
whether the scope of judicial review of arbitration awards should be expanded or contracted.
Professors Brunet and Johnson argue persuasively for expanded review of awards issued
under the aegis of the NASD (now FINRA). They state: “Unlike traditional arbitration
involving contractual disputes, SRO [self-regulatory organization] arbitrations adjudicate
nonwaivable statutory rights. In legitimizing mandatory SRO arbitration, the Supreme Court
presumed that arbitration was only a procedural choice, not a substantive choice . . . The Court
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E. Statutory Rationale
The statutory rationale for plenary review for errors of federal statutory law
appears in § 10(a)(4) of the FAA, the subsection requiring vacatur when the
arbitrators exceeded their authority.221 When parties arbitrate federally protected
rights, they implicitly instruct the arbitrators to uphold their rights. No sensible
person would arbitrate a securities fraud claim or a racial discrimination claim if he
or she thought the process provided no safeguards to ensure that the law would be
applied correctly. As noted above, a basic precept of arbitration policy is to respect
the intent of the parties to an arbitration agreement.222 By erring, arbitrators breach
the intent of the parties to ensure the application of statutory rights and therefore
exceed their authority. Moreover, the public policies vindicated in the statutes
granting such rights do not permit the arbitrators to deny claimants such rights,
intentionally or unintentionally. Under § 10(a)(4), correction of such errors falls to
the courts.223
also assumed that judicial review, although limited, would be ‘sufficient to ensure that the
arbitrators comply with the requirements of the statute.’ As explained elsewhere, however,
there is no meaningful judicial review of SRO arbitration awards.” Brunet and Johnson, supra
note 2, at 489-90. See also Leroy, supra note 123, at 24 (contending that “Gilmer’s theory of
forum substitution means that federal courts should vacate arbitration awards and court
judgments [deciding federal statutory claims] at equal rates.”). But see Richard C. Reuben,
Building the Civilization of Arbitration: Personal Autonomy and Vacatur After Hall Street,
113 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1103, 1127-28 (2009) (arguing for the abandonment of the manifest
disregard standard and against any substantive review because “from the perspective of the
courts, it is hard to imagine a move more detrimental to judicial efficiency than permitting
expanded judicial review.”); Hayford, supra note 14, at 841 (advocating limited judicial
review such that “[u]nless the commercial arbitration award is flawed by the types of party,
advocate, or arbitrator misconduct defined in section 10(a) of the FAA, or compels the
violation of a well defined and dominant public policy, the parties to a commercial arbitration
agreement are stuck with the result the arbitration proceeding produces.”).
221

See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2006).

222

Professor Stipanowich has expressed the case for the primacy of party intent
persuasively. He has stated: “[T]he central and primary value of arbitration is not speed, or
economy, or privacy, or neutral expertise, but rather the ability of users to make key process
choices to suit their particular needs . . . Choice is what sets arbitration apart from litigation. If
parties truly desire an expedited procedure in which speed and economy are the preeminent
goals, it is possible to structure and implement a ‘lean program’ to achieve those ends at the
cost of various procedural bells and whistles. Expedited arbitration may also be utilized to
strike a balance between the need for final adjudication and the maintenance of an ongoing
commercial relationship. If, on the other hand, cost-savings and a quick result are much less
important than controlled ‘quasi-litigation’—extensive legal due process with a tribunal
comprised of three grand old ships-of-the-line that results in a highly ‘authoritative’ decision –
that too is an option.” Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The New Litigation, 2010 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1, 51-52 (2010).
223
Numerous courts have held that a violation of a well-defined and dominant public
policy is a judicially created ground for vacatur, rather than a ground for vacatur under §
10(a)(4). See, e.g., Lewis v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 500 F.3d 1140, 1150-51 (10th Cir.
2007) (stating that the public policy exception is a “common law” ground of review);
Greenburg v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 220 F.3d 22, 27 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting that the public
policy exception is a ground of review additional to those prescribed in § 10 of the FAA);
Seymour v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 988 F.2d 1020, 1023 (10th Cir. 1993) (confirming that
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One might argue that by invoking the intent of the parties to liberalize the scope
of judicial review, expanded review conflicts with Hall Street’s holding that parties
cannot contractually broaden the scope of review of arbitration awards.224 There is
no such conflict. First, the argument for expanded review applies only to awards
denying claims of federal rights. Hall Street did not assert such a claim, but rather
sought to enforce its contractual right of indemnification against Mattel.225 Second,
the argument for expanded review proposes that the courts interpret § 10(a)(4) to
permit such review. Although drawing on the policy to uphold party intent, the
argument for expanded review is statutory.
Since Hall Street and Concepcion,226 the survival of the manifest disregard
standard has become dubious. If the Supreme Court rejects the narrow manifest
disregard standard, it will surely reject a broader standard of review for errors of law.
The only alternative is for Congress to intervene. It should consider the state of
arbitration today rather than the state of arbitration in 1925. If it views the FAA, not
as a static law but as a dynamic one, it should fashion the FAA into a modern
arbitration statute in a climate where virtually any federal claim is arbitrable and
thousands of such claims are arbitrated every year.
F. Review of Awards Not Deciding Federal Statutory Rights
Thousands of claims, not asserting federal statutory rights, also go to arbitration.
Until Hall Street, the entire federal judiciary, following Wilko’s dicta, applied the
manifest disregard standard indiscriminately to all arbitration awards. It is absurd to
apply the same standard of review to arbitrations resolving claims for breach of
contract and to arbitrations resolving claims for racial discrimination. The
mechanical application of this flawed, single standard of review is like forcing
everyone to fit into the same pair of worn out shoes.
V. STOLT-NIELSEN V. ANIMALFEEDS AND BEYOND
This Part will begin with an analysis of Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds
International Corp.,227 in which the Supreme Court applied de novo review to a
the public policy exception is a “judicially-created ground for vacating an arbitration award.”).
If courts do not consider the“public policy exception” to fall within § 10(a)(4) of the FAA, it
is unlikely that, without a directive from the Supreme Court, they would hold that § 10(a)(4)
covers violations of federal statutory rights. Professor Mercantel believes that the courts
should reconsider this position and hold that when arbitrators issue awards that offend a
dominant public policy they have exceeded their authority. See Jonathan A. Mercantel, The
Crumbled Difference Between Legal and Illegal Arbitration Awards: Hall Street Associates
and the Waning Public Policy Exception, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 597, 634 (2009)
(arguing that “while section 10(a)(4) has not been interpreted as including the public policy
exception in the past, nothing would preclude the courts from simply expanding their
interpretation of section 10(a)(4) to include the public policy exception.”).
224
Hall Street Assocs., LLC. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 586 (2008) (holding that the
grounds for vacatur prescribed in the FAA are exclusive).
225

Id. at 579-81.

226

See infra note 268 and accompanying text (declaring that the grounds for vacatur in the
FAA focus on misconduct rather than mistake).
227

Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
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partial arbitration award. By doing so, the Court hinted that it might entertain
broadening the standard of review under appropriate circumstances. This possibility
was extinguished in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.228 This Part will also
discuss the public policy exception, which directs courts to correct errors in awards
that violate well-defined federal public policy. After approving of the public policy
exception, this Part will discuss the appropriate standard of review for awards that do
not decide federal statutory rights or violate well-established public policy. It will
conclude that federal courts should not review such awards for errors of law, even if
those errors are manifest. Finally, this Part will refute the argument that the proposal
in this Article would defeat the efficiency of arbitration.
A. The Stolt-Nielsen Decision: A Glimmer of Hope
The Stolt-Nielsen decision is both provocative and curious because the Court’s
rhetoric did not match its analysis. The Court concluded that the manifest disregard
standard was met, although there was no showing whatsoever that the arbitration
panel intentionally flouted of the law. Rather, the Court merely found that the
arbitration panel had made ordinary legal and factual errors.
1. Facts and Procedural Background
A supplier of liquid ingredients to producers of animal feed, AnimalFeeds
entered into contracts, known as Vegoilvoy charter parties, to ship products to its
customers.229 An arbitration clause was a standard provision included in these
charter parties.230 When, in 2003, AnimalFeeds learned that a Department of Justice
investigation had revealed illegal price-fixing activities by shipping companies,
AnimalFeeds brought a putative class action against a number of such companies,
including Stolt-Nielsen, alleging antitrust violations.231 In 2005, AnimalFeeds
served a demand for class arbitration on the defendant shipping companies.232
The parties agreed to submit to a panel of three arbitrators the issue whether the
class action was arbitrable.233 After conducting hearings, the arbitrators ruled that
the arbitration clause permitted class arbitration.234 The shipping companies moved
to vacate the partial award, and the district court granted the motion on the ground
228

AT&T Mobility LLC. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1752 (2011).

229

Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 130 S. Ct. at 1754 (2010).

230

Id. at 1765. The arbitration clause provided: “Any dispute arising from the making,
performance or termination of this Charter Party shall be settled in New York, Owner and
Charterer each appointing an arbitrator, who shall be a merchant, broker or individual
experienced in the shipping business; the two thus chosen, if they cannot agree, shall nominate
a third arbitrator who shall be an Admiralty lawyer. Such arbitration shall be conducted in
conformity with the provisions and procedures of the United States Arbitration Act [the FAA],
and a judgment of the Court shall be entered upon any award made by said arbitrator.”
231

Id.

232

Id.

233

Id. The panel was to follow the rules of the American Arbitration Association’s
Supplemental Rules for Class Arbitrations. Id.
234

Id. at 1766.
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that the arbitrators had manifestly disregarded the law.235 The district court found
that the arbitrators failed to make any meaningful choice-of-law analysis.236 Clear
cut choice-of-law rules, the court reasoned, pointed to the applicability of maritime
law, which, under industry custom and practice, showed that the arbitration clauses
in question foreclosed class arbitration.237 The Second Circuit reversed, noting,
“Had the district court been charged with reviewing the arbitration panel’s decision
de novo, we might well find its analysis persuasive. But the errors it identified do
not, in our view, rise to the level of manifest disregard of the law.”238
2. The Supreme Court’s Distortion of “Manifest Disregard”
The Supreme Court analyzed the case under FAA § 10(a)(4), which provides that
a court may vacate an award when the arbitrators “exceeded their authority.”239
Since Stolt-Nielsen also argued that the Second Circuit erred in holding that the
arbitrators had not manifestly disregarded the law, the Supreme Court commented on
whether the manifest disregard standard survived Hall Street. The Court stated: “We
do not decide whether ‘manifest disregard’ survives our decision in Hall Street
Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 585 (2008), as an independent
ground for review or as a judicial gloss on the enumerated grounds for vacatur set
forth in 9 U. S. C. § 10.”240 Nevertheless, in addition to analyzing the case under the
exceeded-their-authority test, the Court analyzed the case under the manifest

235

Id.

236

Id.

237

Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 435 F. Supp. 2d 382, 384-86 (S. D. N. Y.
2006).
238

Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 96 (2d Cir. 2008). As a
preliminary matter, the Second Circuit held that the manifest disregard standard survived Hall
Street as a judicial gloss on the exceeding-their-authority ground for vacatur prescribed in §
10(a)(4) of the FAA. Id. at 95. Applying the standard, the Second Circuit showed that,
contrary to the conclusion reached by the district court, the arbitrators did not manifestly
disregard choice-of-law principles by failing to undertake a choice-of-law analysis. Id. at 9697. First, Stolt-Nielsen’s brief to the arbitrators referred to choice-of-law in a single footnote
without supporting authority. Id. at 96. More importantly, Stolt-Nielsen conceded in the
footnote that the arbitrators “need not decide this [choice-of-law] issue, however, because the
analysis is the same under either [New York law or maritime law].” Id. Furthermore, the
arbitrators did consider the choice-of-law issue. Their award stated that they “must look to the
language of the parties’ agreement to ascertain the parties’ intention whether they intended to
permit or to preclude class action. This is . . . consistent with New York State law . . . and
federal maritime law,” which, the Second Circuit explained, merely provide guidelines rather
than fixed rules of decision. See id. at 97-99.
239

Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1767-68 (2010). The majority found that the panel had
exceeded its authority. Id. at 1767-68. Justice Ginsburg disagreed. She noted that StoltNielsen asserted only one statutory ground for vacatur. Stolt-Nielsen argued that the panel
had exceeded its authority. She pointed out that by “referring the class-arbitration issue to an
arbitration panel,” the parties had “undoubtedly empowered the arbitrators to render their
clause-construction decision. That scarcely debatable point should resolve this case.” Id. at
1780 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
240

Id. at 1768 n.3 (internal citations omitted).
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disregard standard, adopting AnimalFeeds’ definition arguendo.241 This definition
stated that arbitrators have manifestly disregarded the law when they “knew of the
relevant [legal] principle, appreciated that this principle controlled the outcome of
the disputed issue, and nonetheless willfully flouted the governing law by refusing to
apply it.”242 The Court concluded that, under the circumstances presented on appeal,
this standard was satisfied.243
Scrutinizing the Supreme Court’s analysis reveals, however, that the Court
applied a more exacting test than that permitted by the manifest disregard standard:
It engaged in de novo review. In analyzing the award, the Court speculated that the
panel impermissibly disregarded the parties’ agreement against class arbitration and
imposed on the parties the panel’s view of public policy.244 However, the Court’s
criticism of the panel centered on the weight the panel gave to certain factual
submissions – an approach not permitted by the manifest disregard standard – and on
the legal conclusions the panel made when endeavoring to resolve a complex
question of unsettled law that might have vexed experienced judges.245
It is striking that the Court faulted the arbitrators’ findings of fact. The Court
criticized the arbitrators for giving insufficient weight to evidence that the Vegoilvoy
Charter Party had never provided the basis for class arbitration.246 It also chided the
arbitrators for not being persuaded by expert speculation that sophisticated
multinational commercial parties would never intend the arbitration clauses in
question to authorize class arbitration.247
To the extent that the Court relied on the panel’s “mistaken” factual findings to
conclude that the panel manifestly disregarded the law, the Court misapplied the
manifest disregard standard. Any judicial review of the factual basis for an award,
let alone scrutiny at such a microscopic level, clashes with the precept of limited
judicial review. In Wallace v. Buttar,248 the Second Circuit stated a fundamental
principle of arbitration, noting that “[a] federal court may not conduct a reassessment
of the evidentiary record.”249 The standard of review is restricted to manifest
241

Id. at 1768 n.3.

242

Id.

243

Id.

244

Id. at 1768.

245

See infra notes 245-263 and accompanying text (discussing the reasoning of the
Supreme Court majority in the Stolt-Nielsen opinion).
246

Stolt-Neilsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1769. Justice Ginsburg countered with the panel’s
suggestion that, if a class were certified, only parties willing to participate would opt in and
those unwilling to participate would be excluded from the class. Id. at 1781 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
247

Id. at 1769.

248

Wallace v. Buttar, 378 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2004).

249

Id. at 193; see also Electro Sci. Indus., Inc. v. Dooley, No. 10CV1564AC, 2011 WL
1883850 (D. Ore. May 17, 2011) (refusing to vacate award because the court has no authority
to re-weigh evidence offered at the arbitration hearing); Coutee v. Barington Capital Grp.,
L.P., 336 F.3d 1128, 1133 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that “[m]anifest disregard of the facts is not
an independent ground for vacatur in this circuit.”); French v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 784 F.2d 902, 906 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that a court will an confirm award with
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disregard of the law, not the evidence.250 By sifting through the record in StoltNielsen and weighing the evidence, the Supreme Court ignored this fundamental
principle. Of course, the Supreme Court may establish any standard of review it
wishes, but it is remarkable that, while professing fidelity to the manifest disregard
standard, the Court breached the narrow confines of that standard.
The Supreme Court’s criticisms of the panel’s legal analysis also failed to meet
the manifest disregard standard. The Court faulted the panel for not following “court
cases denying the consolidation of arbitrations,”251 though, as the Court itself
emphasized, the issue presented in the Stolt-Nielsen case was unsettled.252 The issue
had been presented in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle,253 but, the Stolt-Nielsen
Court pointed out that only a plurality of the Bazzle Court reached a consensus on
that issue.254 The Court chided the panel for concluding incorrectly that Bazzle
“controlled” the “resolution” of the question whether the Vegoilvoy charter party
“permit[s] this arbitration to proceed on behalf of a class.”255
Though the Stolt-Nielsen Court was right in pointing out that Bazzle was merely
a plurality decision and therefore not binding precedent,256 the panel’s reading of
Bazzle was essentially correct. The Bazzle plurality stated that, when an agreement
is silent on the issue of class arbitration, the issue is for the arbitrator, not the courts,
to decide.257 It was understandable, if not appropriate, for the panel to have relied on
the Bazzle plurality decision, because Bazzle was the most authoritative statement on
the issue. Nevertheless, the Stolt-Nielsen Court lamented that “both the parties and
the arbitration panel seem to have misunderstood Bazzle, [believing] that it
established the standard to be applied by a decision maker in determining whether a
contract may permissibly be interpreted to allow class arbitration.”258
“erroneous findings of fact”); Success Sys., Inc. v. Maddy Petroleum Equip., Inc., 316 F.
Supp. 2d 93, 94 (D. Conn. 2004) (observing that “the Second Circuit does not recognize
manifest disregard of the evidence as a proper ground for vacating an arbitrator’s award.”).
But see Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 204 (2d Cir. 1998) (vacating award
based on “manifest disregard” of the evidence). Halligan, however, contradicts the view
followed overwhelmingly by the federal judiciary. See Norman S. Poser, Judicial Review of
Arbitration Award: Manifest Disregard of the Law, 64 BROOKLYN L. REV. 471, 503 (1998)
(calling the Halligan decision a “radical departure from existing arbitration law”).
250

Wallace, 378 F.3d at 193.

251

Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1769 (2010).

252

Id. at 1772.

253

Id. at 1770. See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003).

254

Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1772.

255

Id. at 1770.

256

Green Tree Fin. Corp., 539 U.S. at 447.

257

Id. at 453. The plurality stated: “The question here—whether the contracts forbid class
arbitration—does not fall within this narrow exception [gateway matters that are for the court
to decide]. . . . It concerns contract interpretation and arbitration procedure. Arbitrators are
well situated to answer that question. Given these considerations, along with the arbitration
contracts’ sweeping language concerning the scope of the questions committed to arbitration,
this matter of contract interpretation should be for the arbitrator, not the courts, to decide.” Id.
258

Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1772.
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The Court then proceeded to resolve the issue whether the parties had agreed to
class arbitration. Its resolution conflicted with the position of the Bazzle plurality.
Emphasizing the FAA’s policy to honor party intent, the Court believed that “the
differences between bilateral and class-action arbitration are too great for arbitrators
to presume, consistent with their limited powers under the FAA, that the parties’
mere silence on the issue of class-action arbitration constitutes consent to resolve
their disputes in class proceedings.”259 The Court stressed that the parties’
stipulation that there was “no agreement” to proceed as a class foreclosed any
possibility of an agreement for class arbitration.260
Joined by Justices Stevens and Breyer, Justice Ginsburg wrote a dissenting
opinion,261 aptly accusing the majority of “indulging in de novo review.”262 The
majority had not found that the panel had flouted the law. At most, the panel had
failed to anticipate the Court’s new rule restricting class arbitration.263 Although the
Court claimed to apply the manifest disregard standard, it applied the broadest form
of review.264
B. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion: All Hope Lost?
The Stolt-Nielsen decision might have been read as an indication of the Court’s
willingness to consider expanding the scope of judicial review under appropriate
circumstances. Such a reading, however, became untenable with AT&T Mobility
LLC v. Concepcion.265 In Concepcion, the Supreme Court held that the FAA
259

Id. at 1776.

260

Id. See also id. at 1766. The majority made much of what they construed as a
concession by AnimalFeeds’ counsel who said to the arbitration panel, “All the parties agree
that when a contract is silent on the issue there’s been no agreement that has been reached on
[that] issue . . . .” Id. Justice Ginsburg quoted the remainder of the sentence, which the
majority had conveniently omitted. “[T]herefore there has been no agreement to bar class
arbitrations.” Then, as Justice Ginsburg noted, counsel clarified his statement by adding, “It’s
also undisputed that the arbitration clause here contains broad language and this language
should be interpreted to permit class arbitrations.” Id. at 1781 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
261
Id. at 1777 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg argued that the case was not ripe
for review by the Supreme Court because the panel’s decision was “abstract and highly
interlocutory.” Id. at 1778. All the panel had ruled, she noted, was that the charter party
permitted class arbitration. The panel had not decided whether AnimalFeeds’ claims were
suitable for class arbitration or who might be eligible for inclusion if such a class were
certified. Id.
262
Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg criticized the majority for “substitut[ing]
its judgment for that of the decisionmakers chosen by the parties.” Id. It is curious that while
applying a rigorous standard of review the Court insisted that the scope of review for arbitral
awards is limited. Id. at 1776.
263

Id. at 1775-76.

264

But see S.I. Strong, Does Class Arbitration “Change the Nature” of Arbitration? StoltNielsen, AT&T and a Return to First Principles, 17 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. at 52. (forthcoming
2012) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1791928 (fearing that Stolt-Nielsen may
foreshadow that “courts would not only permit review of partial final awards, but would use a
less deferential standard such as review for a mistake of law.”).
265

AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
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preempts a California judicial rule prohibiting class arbitration waivers in consumer
contracts of adhesion.266 To support its holding, the Court contrasted the scope of
review of a court decision with the scope of review of an arbitration award. After
noting that a lower court decision is reviewed de novo for errors of law, the
Concepcion Court highlighted the narrow scope of review under § 10 of the FAA.
The Court stated:
Section 10 “allows a court to vacate an arbitral award only where the
award” ‘was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means’; ‘there was
evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators’; ‘the arbitrators were
guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing…or in refusing
to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy[,] or of any
other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced’;
or if the arbitrators ‘exceeded their powers or so imperfectly executed
them that a mutual, final, and definite award …was not made.’267
This statement confirmed Hall Street’s holding that the FAA provides the exclusive
grounds for vacatur. The Concepcion Court, however, added that “review under §
10 focuses on misconduct rather than mistake.”268 This conception of review—
foreclosing the correction of errors of law—dispels any thoughts that Stolt-Nielsen
signaled the Court’s receptivity to any form of expanded review. There is, however,
one ground of substantive review that will likely survive Hall Street and
Concepcion.
C. The Public Policy Exception
Federal courts have long vacated awards that offend “well accepted and deep
rooted public policy.”269 Courts have applied the public policy exception to prevent
266

Id. at 1753.

267

Id. at 1752.

268

Id.

269

Diapulse Corp. of America v. Carba, Ltd., 626 F.3d 1108, 1110 (2d Cir. 1980). In W.R.
Grace & Co. v. Local 259, Int’l Union of United Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757 (1983), the
Supreme Court stated that such a public policy must be “well defined and dominant, and . . .
ascertained ‘by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations
of supposed public interests.’” (quoting Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 66 (1945)).
In United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987), the Supreme Court
followed this strict definition of public policy. Cooper, a Misco employee, operated heavy
equipment. After he was twice reprimanded for operating the equipment negligently, the
company discovered that he was a marijuana user and fired him. Cooper filed for arbitration
under his collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 33. The arbitrator ordered Cooper’s
reinstatement and the circuit court vacated the award. The Supreme Court reversed the order
of the circuit court, id. at 44, holding, that, although sensible, the public policy proclaimed by
the circuit court was not based on settled doctrine. Id. at 35. Although W.R. Grace and Misco
are cases arising under the Labor Management Relations Act, the federal courts have accepted
a similar public policy standard in commercial arbitration cases arising under the FAA. See,
e.g., Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Services, 105 F.3d 1465, 1486 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting Misco
with approval and stating that awards resulting from the mandatory arbitration of federal
statutory claims are subject to at least the same rigor of review that applies to awards resulting
from labor arbitration); Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Lawrence Cnty. v. L. Robert Kimball &
Associates., 860 F.2d 683, 686 (6th Cir. 1988) (stating that public policy review of
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the enforcement of awards that would endanger public health or safety, or order the
performance of illegal acts.270 For example, in Diapulse Corp. of America v. Carba,
Ltd.,271 Diapulse manufactured the “Diapulse Machine,” a medical device designed
to promote healing.272 Diapulse entered into a distributorship agreement with Carba
engaging Carba as its exclusive sales representative in Germany and Switzerland.273
When Carba began marketing its new “lonar” device in competition with the
Diapulse Machine, Diapulse initiated arbitration seeking to enforce a noncompetition clause in the distributorship agreement.274 The arbitrator issued an
award, which, without specifying any geographical boundary or time limitation,
barred Carba from selling devices “similar” to the Diapulse Machine.275 The district
court held that the award, which was both vague and overbroad, constituted an
unreasonable restraint of trade violating federal public policy. Accordingly, the
court modified the award.276
Although Hall Street and Concepcion, taken together, show that the Supreme
Court, at least for the present, rejects expanded review, the public policy exception
will likely survive.277 One can hardly contemplate that the Court would countenance
commercial arbitration awards is at least as rigorous as public policy review of labor
arbitration awards).
270
See Kenneth R. Davis, When Ignorance of the Law is No Excuse: Judicial Review of
Arbitration Awards, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 49, 109 (1997) (noting that the courts will not confirm
commercial arbitration awards that endanger public health or safety, or order specific
enforcement of illegal contracts).
271

Diapulse, 626 F.3d at 1108.

272

Id. at 1009.

273

Id.

274

Id.

275

Id. at 1110.

276

Id. The Second Circuit held that the district court overstepped its authority, under § 10
and § 11 of the FAA, by modifying the award. Id. Addressing the public policy issue, the
Second Circuit vacated the award as “indefinite” under §10(d) of the FAA. Id. at 1111. The
Second Circuit instructed the district court to refer the matter back to the arbitrator for
clarification of the award. Id.
277

Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1776 (2010). One author is concerned that Hall Street has
abolished the public policy exception for reviewing arbitration awards. He reasons as follows:
“Hall Street held that the grounds for vacatur enumerated in the FAA are exclusive. Since the
public policy exception is nonstatutory, Hall Street has abolished it.” Mercantel, supra note
223, at 624-25. Another scholar is more optimistic. He states, “The public policy exception is
well-grounded and well-established, and nothing in the Hall Street opinion evinces an intent
to eliminate it. It seems likely that courts will [continue to] recognize a public policy
exception . . . at least for illegal arbitration awards . . . . Less certain is whether courts will
extend that exception to include the broader class of ‘well defined and dominant’ policies
recognized in Misco.”). Reuben, supra note 220, at 1143. Professor Reuben is probably
closer to the truth. It is inconceivable that courts will confirm awards threatening public health
or safety, or ordering the performance of illegal acts. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Int’l Ass’n
of Machinists, 648 F. Supp. 2d 193, 194 (D. Mass. 2009) (supporting the vitality of the public
policy exception post-Hall Street); MyLinda K. Sims & Richard A. Bales, Much Ado About
Nothing: The Future of Manifest Disregard After Hall Street, 62 S.C. L. REV. 407, 433 (2010)
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an award that endangered public health or safety. The Court would seem compelled
to invalidate dangerous and illegal awards. It is inconceivable that the Court would
confirm an award that blessed the unlawful monopolization of the high tech industry,
or the dangerous operation of a nuclear facility. To justify the continued viability of
the public policy exception, one might reason that neither Hall Street nor
Concepcion considered or decided the propriety of the public policy exception.
Furthermore, Concepcion’s pronouncement on the narrow scope of review was
merely dicta. The Hall Street Court’s use of the word “exclusive” must be read
within the context of the facts presented in the case and the Court’s ruling, which
merely rejected the right of the parties to expand the scope of review in an arbitration
agreement.
D. All Other Cases
This Article proposes that federal courts apply plenary review for errors of law
when either federal statutory rights or federal public policy is at stake. These two
circumstances, however, do not apply to a sizeable number of arbitrations. Any
comprehensive framework should propose a standard of judicial review that would
apply to the cases that do not fit the McMahon or public policy mold.
When parties submit an issue for arbitration to a trade association or an
arbitration organization, they often do not specify the law that will control. In such
cases, there should be no review for errors of law under the FAA. The reason for
this deferential standard is that, without instructions to the contrary, arbitrators are
free to decide matters before them according to their own sense of justice. One
scholar has commented, “Arbitrators are not compelled to apply rules of substantive
law. The weight of authority permits an arbitrator to ‘do justice as he sees it’ and
fashion an award that embodies the individual justice required by a given set of
facts.”278 Given that arbitrators are generally not bound to apply substantive law,
courts have no basis to review awards for legal error. In Lentine v. Fundaro,279 the
New York Court of Appeals upheld an arbitration award distributing the assets of a
partnership in liquidation.280 Writing for the court, Judge Breitel explained that the
court would not invalidate an arbitration award on the ground that the arbitrator
committed an error of law.281 He noted, “Absent provision to the contrary in the
(suggesting that the public policy exception survived Hall Street, and concluding that Hall
Street’s statement that the grounds for vacatur in the FAA are exclusive must refer only to
contractual expansion of the scope of review and not to judicially-created grounds because
“[i]t is illogical to ‘cherry pick’ the [judicially-created] grounds that survive post-Hall
Street.”); Codie Henderson, The Hall Street Hangover: Recovering and Rediscovering
Avenues for Review of Arbitration Awards; Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396
(2008), 10 WYO. L. REV. 299, 314 (2010) (suggesting that the public policy exception will
survive Hall Street because review for violations of public policy does not require a review
into the merits of the award and also because “public policy has an established history in the
law and would be difficult to supplant.”).
278

See Edward Brunet, Arbitration and Constitutional Rights, 71 N.C. L. REV. 81, 85
(1996).
279

Lentine v. Fundaro, 278 N.E.2d 633 (N.Y. App. Div. 1972).

280

Id. at 636.

281

Id. at 635-36.
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arbitration agreement, arbitrators are not bound by principles of substantive law . . .
.”282
In the absence of a directive from the parties to apply particular law, the policy of
the FAA to promote efficiency in arbitration dovetails with the primary policy of the
FAA, which is to honor party intent. Any level of substantive review would conflict
with the policy promoting efficiency since review injects cost and delay into the
dispute resolution process. Similarly, substantive review would conflict with party
intent by imposing a legal regime on the parties against their wishes as expressed in
their arbitration agreement.
Parties often include a choice-of-law clause in their arbitrate agreements.283
Although such a clause binds the arbitrator, it creates no obligation for a federal
court to review an award for errors of law. The Hall Street decision, which holds
that the FAA forbids parties from contractually expanding judicial review to correct
errors of law, is consistent with this principle.284
State law policy may be implicated if an arbitrator misapplies state law, but,
absent unusual circumstances, federal policy is not. Long before enactment of the
FAA, parties to arbitration agreements sometimes chose to be governed by state law,
and the courts then, as now, honored such contractual provisions.285 Section 9 of the
282
Id. at 385, 635. See also Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220,
259 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that “arbitrators
are not bound by precedent”); Liggett v. Torrington Bldg. Co., 158 A. 917, 919 (Conn. 1932)
(noting that “[a]rbitrators, being customarily chosen by the parties because of special
knowledge or skill in connection with the matter to be decided, are not bound to follow strict
rules of law, unless it be made a condition of the submission, but are expected to determine
the questions presented to them in light of their own special skill and knowledge.”); Mayberry
v. Mayberry, 28 S.E. 349, 350 (1897) (commenting that “[a]rbitrators are a law unto
themselves and may decide according to their views of justice”); Soia Mentschikoff,
Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 867 (1961) (stating that arbitrators for trade
associations have the task of “selecting the most relevant or appropriate norms”).
283
See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 64 (1995) (holding
that a New York choice-of-law provision in a standard securities account agreement did not
prevent arbitrators from awarding punitive damages); Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of
Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University, 489 U.S. 468, 491 (1989) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (commenting that “[m]ost commercial contracts written in this country contain
choice-of-law clauses”); Thomas A. Diamond, Choice of Law Clauses and Their Preemptive
Effect upon the Federal Arbitration Act: Reconciling the Supreme Court with Itself, 39 ARIZ.
L. REV. 35, 35 (1997) (noting that parties often agree to both an arbitration clause and a
choice-of-law clause).
284

Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 579 (2008) (holding that the
FAA does not permit the parties to an arbitration agreement to require the courts to correct
awards “where the arbitrator’s conclusions of law are erroneous”).
285
In re of Wilkins, 62 N.E. 575, 576 (N.Y. App. Div. 1902) the New York Court of
Appeals stated: “Where the merits of a controversy are referred to an arbitrator selected by the
parties, his determination, either as to the law or the facts, is final and conclusive, and a court
will not open an award unless perverse misconstruction or positive misconduct upon the part
of the arbitrator is plainly established, or there is some provision in the agreement of
submission authorizing it.” (emphasis added); see also Lentine v. Fundaro, 278 N.E. 2d 633,
635 (1972) (citing pre-1925 cases for the proposition that arbitrators must follow the law
when the arbitration agreement so provides); cf. Leete v. Griswold Post No. 79, American
Legion, 158 A. 919 (1932) (noting that arbitrators are bound by the law if the parties’
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FAA provides that an award must be confirmed unless one of the grounds
enumerated in § 10 or § 11 requires its nullification.286 Congress elected not to
include errors of law as an enumerated ground for vacatur. Although Congress did
not contemplate that this exclusion would apply to awards deciding federal statutory
rights, Congress surely intended that this exclusion would apply to cases where the
parties chose to be governed by state law. It appears therefore that Congress, when
passing the FAA, did not intend for federal courts to review arbitration awards for
errors of state law.
By denying substantive review in such cases, the courts are promoting efficiency
in arbitration by minimizing federal court involvement. State court involvement is
another matter. If an arbitrator reaches an erroneous decision on a matter of state
law, the appropriate remedy is to seek vacatur under state arbitration law, not under
the FAA.
E. Reduced Efficiency
Opponents of the proposal in this Article will undoubtedly argue that, if
implemented, the proposal would reduce the efficiency of arbitration. Review for
errors of law in awards resolving claims asserting federal statutory rights would
arguably increase the role of the courts in the process. For those who value the
simplicity and economy of arbitration, such a development would be anathema.287
This fear, however, is unfounded. The prevailing narrow scope of review has not
deterred lawyers from seeking vacatur of awards. Courts have therefore been
obliged to analyze the legal grounds allegedly supporting vacatur. Judicial decisions
plumbing arbitral awards for manifest disregard of the law frequently inhabit the
case-law reporters.288 Implementing the approach proposed in the Article would
probably not increase the judicial caseload materially.
The expenditure of judicial energy needed to determine whether an arbitrator
manifestly disregarded the law would not differ substantially to if at all, from the
time and effort required to determine if an award failed to uphold a federal right.
The approach advocated in this Article might even reduce the burden on the
submission directs them to follow the law.) New York statutory law and decisional law were
particularly central to the shaping of federal arbitration policy and passage of the FAA. In
1920, New York State passed the first pro-arbitration statute in the United States, and the FAA
was modeled after the New York statute. See Joint Hearings before the Sub Committee of the
Committees on the Judiciary, supra note 122 (Statement by Julius Henry Cohen to
Subcommittees on the Judiciary noting that the FAA was patterned after the New York State
arbitration statute, which in 1920 became the first pro-arbitration statute in the country); see
also Brian T. Burns, 78 FORD. L. REV. 1813, 1818 (2010) (reporting that Congress patterned
the FAA after the New York state arbitration statute and sometimes looked to decisions of the
New York Court of Appeals for guidance on how to characterize arbitration).
286

See 9 U.S.C.A. § 9 (West 2011).

287

See Reuben, supra note 220, at 1127 (arguing that “from the perspective of the courts, it
is hard to imagine a move more detrimental to judicial efficiency than permitting expanded
judicial review.”).
288

See Ashby Jones, Arbitration: Increasingly, It’s Not over Until the Vacatur Motion
Fails (Feb. 2010), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/02/14/arbitration-increasingly-it's-not-overuntil-the-vacatur-motion-fail/ (reporting that in 2010 federal and states courts issued 208
written decisions on motions to vacate arbitration awards).
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judiciary compared to the burden imposed by the manifest disregard standard. In all
cases where a party moves to vacate an award, the court must identify controlling
law and determine if the arbitrator committed error. The manifest disregard standard
adds the step of determining whether the arbitrator knew the law and deliberately
flouted it. The scrutiny that the Supreme Court exercised in Stolt-Nielsen is an
extreme example of the depths of analysis to which a court may resort when
searching for manifest disregard of the law.
If the proposal in this Article were adopted, a reduction in the judicial workload
would result from awards not deciding federal rights or violating federal public
policy. Awards deciding state-law claims would receive no substantive review.
Equally important, the approach proposed in this Article reconciles conflicts between
FAA policy and policies of federal substantive law. The manifest disregard standard
fails to reach a sensible or workable reconciliation of these policies. Having no
review for awards deciding federal statutory rights is even less acceptable than the
manifest disregard standard.
Some might prefer a single standard of review to the standard proposed in this
Article. A single-standard approach, however, lacks the sensitivity to evaluate
awards appropriately. The relative strength of competing policies must set the
agenda for a more finely calibrated system of judicial review. Furthermore, the
current state of the law recognizes a hodgepodge of nonstatutory standards of
review, all of which could be discarded if the approach proposed in this Article were
adopted.289 This approach would promote simplicity by eliminating three current
standards of review for arbitration awards: the “irrational” test, the “completely
irrational” test, and the “arbitrary and capricious” test.290 Courts would review
awards for erroneously denying federal rights and violating federal public policies.
In such cases, courts would not have to consider questions of irrationality or
capriciousness. In all other cases, the courts would provide no level of review at all.
The task of reviewing such awards would fall to state arbitration law and state court
judges.
VI. CONCLUSION
Since the Supreme Court decided Wilko in 1953, the scope of substantive review
for arbitration awards has bred uncertainty among the courts and dismay among
litigants unable to predict what level of review the courts will apply or how they will
apply it. The Hall Street Court speculated about what “manifest disregard” means
and whether it is even a viable doctrine, but the Court gave no answers. Confused
by the Supreme Court’s indecision, the circuit courts are divided on whether the
289

See, e.g., Davis, A Model for Arbitration, supra note 1, at 167-208 (discussing the
mélange of non-statutory grounds of review for arbitration awards).
290
See, e.g., Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Servs., 341 F.3d 987, 997 (9th Cir. 2003)
(holding that a court may vacate a “completely irrational” award); Ainsworth v. Skurnick, 960
F.2d 939, 941 (11th Cir. 1992) (vacating arbitrary and capricious award); Swift Indus., Inc. v.
Botany Indus., Inc., 466 F.2d 1125, 1135 (3d Cir. 1972) (vacating completely irrational
award); Rivera v. Thomas, 316 F. Supp. 2d 256, 262 (D. Md. 2004) (vacating an irrational
arbitration award); Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc v. Corporale, 664 F. Supp. 72, 75 (S.D.N.Y.
1987) (confirming award because it was rational); Sargent v. Paine Webber, Jackson & Curtis,
Inc., 674 F. Supp. 920, 922 (D.D.C. 1987) (stating that an award must be vacated where the
“arbitrator reveals no support whatever for his determinations”) (quoting NF & M Corp. v.
United Steelworkers of America, 524 F.2d 756, 760 (3d Cir. 1975).
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manifest disregard standard survived Hall Street. Some courts apply the standard to
all awards, whether the awards resolve claims of flagrant sexual harassment or
claims of minor breach of contract. They should not. The manifest disregard
standard is too blunt an instrument to handle such wide-ranging issues. Other courts
have dispensed with the manifest disregard standard. These courts apply no
substantive review at all to awards deciding federal claims, confirming troublesome
awards that deny claimants their rights under the securities laws and civil rights
laws. This trend is likely to grow after Concepcion.
Arbitration law needs a framework for reviewing arbitration awards that is both
workable and sensible. This Article proposes that awards deciding federal statutory
rights should be subject to review for errors of law. Similarly, awards violating
federal public policy must be corrected. All other awards should receive no
substantive review in the federal courts.
The Supreme Court has a disappointing record on establishing a sensible or even
a comprehensible framework. Wilko did not supply the answer. Its ill-conceived
pronouncement invoking the phrase “manifest disregard” has contaminated
arbitration law long enough. Hall Street’s wordplay with the phase “manifest
disregard” turned the law into a puzzle. Concepcion has transformed McMahon’s
assurance of expanded review into a supreme fib, and the gap between the rhetoric
and analysis in Stolt-Nielsen is as daunting as Zeno’s paradox. The Supreme Court
has had 60 years to set things right. That’s longer than Moses wandered in the
wilderness. Maybe it’s time for Congress to act.
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